

## 1. Jurnal ilmiah internasional bereputasi

Judul Artikel: Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the North Natuna Sea, Penulis: Darwis, BA Putra, Nama Jurnal: Asian Affairs: An American Review, 1-21, 2022, Volume Jurnal: 49, Nomor Jurnal: 2, Tahun Terbit Jurnal: 2022, Halaman: 1-21, ISSN: 03068374, 14771500, Penerbit: Routledge

### KOMENTAR:

Link jurnal Asian Affairs: An American Review

<https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/vasa20#:~:text=Asian%20Affairs%3A%20An%20American%20Review%20provides%20in%2Ddepth%20analyses%20of,issues%20relevant%20to%20current%20policymaking.>

Link Jurnal Asian Affairs: An American Review (di Scopus)

<https://www.scopus.com/sourceid/55037?origin=resultslist#tabs=2>

Link jurnal Asian Affairs: An American Review di Scimago:

<https://www.scimagojr.com/journalsearch.php?q=55037&tip=sid&clean=0>

Link artikel di jurnal Asian Affairs: An American Review

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00927678.2022.2089524?src=>

Link artikel di Scopus:

<https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85132332166&origin=resultslist&sort=plf-f&src=s&imp=t&sid=c3269985d79f1468e687495e21b2ac99&sot=br&sdt=a&sl=56&s=SOURCERCE-ID%2855037%29+AND+PUBYEAR+IS+2022+AND+NOT+DOCTYPE%28ip%29&relpos=2&citeCnt=0&searchTerm=>

### 1.1. Klarifikasi Nama Jurnal:

Penggunaan nama jurnal 'Asian Affairs: An American Review' merupakan keputusan internal dari Taylor & Francis. Yang kami ketahui adalah, jurnal ini memiliki tingkatan Scimago Q3, dan mencakup topik '*politics and international relations*.' Memang betul bahwa ada sedikit kebingungan karena nama jurnal yang digunakan di Scimago dan listnya di Scopus adalah 'Asian Affairs.' Namun kami bisa konfirmasi bahwa jurnal ini bukan hijacked, karena bisa langsung di akses di halaman Scopus (jurnal dan artikelnya). Mohon dicross-check lagi terkait ISSN yang sama antara yang tertulis di website Taylor & Francis, Scimago, dan Scopus:

scimagojr.com/journalsearch.php?qs=037&ip=us&crean=0

## Asian Affairs

COUNTRY	SUBJECT AREA AND CATEGORY	PUBLISHER
United Kingdom Universities and research institutions in United Kingdom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Economics, Econometrics and Finance               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Economics and Econometrics</li> <li>Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)</li> </ul> </li> <li>Social Sciences               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Geography, Planning and Development</li> <li>Law</li> <li>Political Science and International Relations</li> <li>Sociology and Political Science</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Taylor and Francis Ltd.
H-INDEX	PUBLICATION TYPE	ISSN
12	Journals	00927678, 19401590

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4 issues per year

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- EBSCOhost Online Research Databases
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Asian Affairs

Scopus coverage years: from 1973 to 2005, from 2010 to Present

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

ISSN: 0092-7678 E-ISSN: 1940-1590

Subject area: Social Sciences: Political Science and International Relations Social Sciences: Sociology and Political Science Economics, Econometrics and Finance: General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Source type: Journal

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ISSN yang digunakan sama: ISSN 0092-7678 dan E-ISSN 1940-1590. Jadi meskipun di halaman jurnal adalah 'Asian Affairs: An American Review.' Jika mengakses artikel ini melalui Scimago, mohon untuk mengklik langsung 'HOMEPAGE,' dan akan langsung muncul halaman Taylor & Francis dengan nama 'Asian Affairs: An American Review.'

Mengenai jumlah dari artikel, kami bisa mengacu langsung pada halaman Scopus jurnal ini. Mungkin saja di beberapa artikel di halaman website Taylor & Francis adalah beberapa campuran dari 'in press' atau 'online first.' Sesuai dengan data scopus, untuk saat ini, jumlah artikel di jurnal ini adalah berikut (bisa diakses di: <https://www.scopus.com/sourceid/55037#tabs=2> )

The screenshot shows the Scopus Source details page for 'Asian Affairs'. The page includes the following information:

- Source details:** Asian Affairs, Scopus coverage years: from 1973 to 2005, from 2010 to Present, Publisher: Taylor & Francis, ISSN: 0092-7678, E-ISSN: 1940-1590.
- Subject area:** Social Sciences: Political Science and International Relations, Social Sciences: Sociology and Political Science, Economics, Econometrics and Finance: General Economics, Econometrics and Finance.
- Source type:** Journal.
- Metrics:** CiteScore 2021: 0.5, SJR 2021: 0.153, SNIP 2015: 0.000.
- Scopus content coverage table:**

Year	Documents published	Actions
2022	7 documents	<a href="#">View citation overview &gt;</a>
2021	5 documents	<a href="#">View citation overview &gt;</a>
2020	15 documents	<a href="#">View citation overview &gt;</a>
2019	4 documents	<a href="#">View citation overview &gt;</a>

Dengan ini kami tekankan bahwa jurnal yang kami maksud BUKAN yang memiliki URL akses berikut:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=raaf20>

The screenshot shows the Taylor & Francis Online journal information page for 'Asian Affairs'. The page includes the following information:

- Journal information:** Print ISSN: 0306-8374, Online ISSN: 1477-1500, 4 issues per year.
- Submission information:** Instructions for authors, Editorial policies.
- Editing services:** Editing services site.
- About this journal:** Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Bibliography of Asian Studies, Cambridge Scientific Abstracts bibliographical series (CAS), De Gruyter Saur bibliographical series, EBSCO.
- Services:** Asian Affairs is currently noted in the following services: Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Bibliography of Asian Studies, Cambridge Scientific Abstracts bibliographical series (CAS), De Gruyter Saur bibliographical series, EBSCO.

Meskipun memiliki nama yang sama, ISSN yang dimiliki jurnal ini BERBEDA dengan apa yang kami usulkan.

## 1.2. Artikel bisa diakses langsung di Scopus

Artikel kami bisa diakses langsung di Scopus pada halaman berikut:

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The screenshot shows the Scopus interface for the article. The title is "Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the North Natuna Sea" by Darwis, Putra, and Bama Andika. The journal is "Asian Affairs(UK)", 2022. The document type is "Article". The ISSN is 00927678 and the DOI is 10.1080/00927678.2022.2089524. The authors are listed as Darwis, Putra, Bama Andika. The affiliation is Universitas Hasanuddin, Indonesia. The abstract states: "The bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam have long been problematic due to the unresolved maritime borders surrounding the North".

Jurnal ini bukan hijack ataupun duplikat. Karena jika iya, tidak mungkin bisa diakses di Scopus, pada jurnal dengan ISSN yang sama dengan yang kami usulkan.

## 1.3. Masa review artikel

Kami ingin klarifikasi bahwa masa korespondensi dan review total adalah 3 bulan, bukan 1 bulan saja. Seperti yang bisa dilihat di halaman artikel online kami:


The screenshot shows the Taylor Francis Online interface for the article. The title is "Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the North Natuna Sea" by Darwis & Bama Andika Putra. The journal is "Asian Affairs: An American Review". The article has 46 views. The abstract states: "The bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam have long been". The article is available for full access.

Di korespondensi kami dengan Paul Chambers (editor), kami telah melakukan review dan revisi intensif selama memang betul 1 bulan. Tapi jumlah revisi yang kami harus lakukan itu lebih dari 5 kali sampai diterima. Waktu komunikasi intensif kami terkesan 1 bulan karena baik dari kami sebagai penulis dan editor, proses membalas korespondensi selalu cepat. Di lampiran 1, kami perlihatkan masa-masa korespondensi intensif antara kami dengan editor, dan lampiran 2 kami perlihatkan semua revisi dan pengembalian revisi yang telah dilalui

#### 1.4. Editor board dan Email

Berikut link editorial board jurnal ini:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=editorialBoard&journalCode=vasa20>



Semua afiliasinya sangat jelas. Kami berkorespondensi dengan Paul Chambers, selaku salah satu executive board jurnal ini. Mengenai penggunaan email pribadi dan penggunaan iphone, kami tidak melihat ada yang salah dengan preferensi ini. Mohon untuk melihat kembali lampiran 2. Beberapa korespondensi yang menjawab misalnya dengan kata-kata terima kasih dan kami tunggu hasil revisinya, memang dilakukan di handphone. Namun tetap banyak revisi dan edit yang dia perlihatkan dikirim melalui sebuah file word di laptop.

## **LAMPIRAN:**

### **Lampiran 1: Korespondensi dan revisi antara pihak author dengan Penerbit Jurnal Internasional Bereputasi (Scopus).**

Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the North Natuna Sea, Penulis: Darwis, BA Putra, Nama Jurnal: Asian Affairs: An American Review, 1-21, 2022, Volume Jurnal: 49, Nomor Jurnal: 2, Tahun Terbit Jurnal: 2022, Halaman: 1-21, ISSN: 03068374, 14771500, Penerbit: Routledge

A manuscript number has been assigned to Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas External Inbox x 🖨️ 📄



**Asian Affairs** <em@editorialmanager.com>  
to me ▾

Fri, Jan 28, 2:27 AM ☆ ↻ ⋮

Dear Mr Bama Andika Putra,

Your submission entitled "Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas" has been assigned the following manuscript number: AsianAffairs-D-22-00005.

You will be able to check on the progress of your paper by logging on to Editorial Manager as an author.  
The URL is <https://www.editorialmanager.com/asianaffairs/>.

Thank you for submitting your work to this journal.

Kind regards,

**Paul Wesley Chambers**, Ph.D.  
Executive Editor  
Asian Affairs: An American Review

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In compliance with data protection regulations, you may request that we remove your personal registration details at any time. (Use the following URL: <https://www.editorialmanager.com/asianaffairs/login.asp?a=r>). Please contact the publication office if you have any questions.

↩ Reply

➡ Forward

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**feedback on your manuscript ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW**

13 messages

**Paul Chambers** <pwchambers@gmail.com>

Thu, Mar 24, 2022 at 4:18 PM

To: bama@unhas.ac.id, Paul Chambers &lt;pwchambers@gmail.com&gt;

Dear Bama Andika Putra,

I am writing to you in regard to your submitted manuscript to Asian Affairs: An American Review.

The two reviewers looked at your work and each of them wants you to make major revisions. (SEE BELOW\_

I want you to send me 2 new papers.

1. The modified manuscript after correcting for the comments of the two reviewers. Changes must be in color.
2. A separate paper which enumerates each reviewer's comments and tells where (page number) all of the places are in the manuscript where you have made changes.

Send these two attachments to me at this email address.

Thank you.

Sincerely, Paul Chambers,  
Executive Editor, Asian Affairs: An American Review (SEE BELOW)**Reviewer 1: Major Revision needed**

This paper tries to explore border conflict in north Natuna between Indonesia and Vietnam. However, author(s) did not display map figuring where border overlapping claims in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Indonesia and Vietnam is. Author (s) do use 1) kinetic effect, 2) explicitness of messages, 3) balance of power among the countries, 4) policy is reactive or pre-emptive, and 5) sustainment of policy. Why do authors prefer to use this model than other. In LR, page 5 line 38 .... not concise and coherent academic debate on this topic. In short, LR is quite poor to explore the case.

**Findings**

Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Sea missed data presented in table or statistics.

How did data analyzed in the Figure 1. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

**Reviewer 2: Reject and Resubmit**

The paper attempts to analyze border conflicts between Vietnam and Indonesia. Using Le Mière's framework, the authors look at five cases of recent incidents of illegal fishing in Indonesian waters to construe Indonesia's diplomatic strategies. There are several issues with the paper. First, the importance of the analysis is not well explained. The paper states that Vietnam is one of the nations in conflict with Indonesia over illegal fishing disputes. China is mentioned as continuing its aggressive manoeuvres in Indonesian waters (p. 3, line 34). As such, there is the question of how serious the Vietnamese threat really is. Second, there have been several hundred cases of vessels trespassing Indonesian waters, but the study only focuses on five incidents that occurred between 2020 and 2021 (p. 2, line 46). Why only five? Based on what criteria were they selected? Third, the paper talks about trends in maritime diplomacy, but the authors only analyse five recent cases. How about the other few hundred cases during Jokowi's first presidential term? Fourth, the paper doesn't discuss the implications of the results. That is, it is unclear what insight can be obtained through the case study analysis.

---

**Bama Andika Putra** <bama@unhas.ac.id>

Sat, Mar 26, 2022 at 3:06 AM

To: Paul Chambers &lt;pwchambers@gmail.com&gt;

Dear Paul Chambers,

Thank you very much for the reviews. We will do our best to complete the major revisions within 4 weeks. I will send the revisions as soon as it is completed.

Regards,  
Bama

[Quoted text hidden]

---

**Paul Chambers** <pwchambers@gmail.com>

Sat, Mar 26, 2022 at 4:23 AM

To: Bama Andika Putra &lt;bama@unhas.ac.id&gt;

Thank you.  
Paul

Sent from my iPhone

On 26 Mar BE 2565, at 10:06, Bama Andika Putra <bama@unhas.ac.id> wrote:

[Quoted text hidden]

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**Bama Andika Putra** <bama@unhas.ac.id>  
To: Paul Chambers <pwchambers@gmail.com>

Tue, Apr 12, 2022 at 5:50 AM

Dear Paul Chambers,

We have completed the major revision of our article entitled: "Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas." Attached to this email is (1) revised manuscript (highlighted and commented), and (2) reviewer comments and the pages revised.


Thank you very much for your time and consideration,

Regards,  
Bama  
[Quoted text hidden]

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**2 attachments**

 **[REV] Reviewer Comments and Revisions.docx**  
17K

 **[REV] ANONYMOUS asian affairs maritime diplomacy copy 2.docx**  
1588K

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**Paul Chambers** <pwchambers@gmail.com>  
To: Bama Andika Putra <bama@unhas.ac.id>

Tue, Apr 12, 2022 at 6:47 AM

Dear Bama Andika Putra,  
Thank you for your email. We will look at your modified manuscript and get back to you soon.

Many best regards,  
Paul

Dr. Paul Chambers  
Executive Editor  
Asian Affairs: An American Review  
[Quoted text hidden]

---

**Paul Chambers** <pwchambers@gmail.com>  
To: Bama Andika Putra <bama@unhas.ac.id>

Tue, Apr 12, 2022 at 3:00 PM

Dear Bama Andika Putra,  
I have looked in detail at your modified paper. I like the changes you made in response to the reviewers' comments. For me, you would still need to make changes before this paper could be published. **You can find my detailed comments in the attached file.**

But in general:


1. **You need to vastly improve your English in this paper. I understand that English is not your native language. But you need to have a native English speaker correct the English errors that exist throughout the paper. We cannot publish your paper without correct English. Please do not try to use a computer to find English mistakes. Please get a native English speaker to make the corrections.**
2. In parts of your paper, you introduce your framework of analysis and then later you introduce your framework of analysis again. You can only do this one time.
3. You need to put together a proper Introduction in which you state what you are examining, why you are examining it (why is it relevant), and what is your argument. You could also say that you are using a particular theory (but need not explain it in the Introduction).

Please take your time to do a good job. All of my comments are made to be constructive, nothing more. But the changes must be made. THANK YOU.

Many best regards,  
Dr. Paul Chambers  
Executive Editor  
Asian Affairs: An American Review

[Quoted text hidden]

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 **[REV] ANONYMOUS asian affairs maritime diplomacy edited PWC.docx**  
1593K

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**Bama Andika Putra** <bama@unhas.ac.id>  
To: Paul Chambers <pwchambers@gmail.com>

Tue, Apr 12, 2022 at 9:36 PM

Dear Paul Chambers,

Thank you very much for your constructive feedback. I will make the revisions and return it back to you. In regards to the English, I will follow your suggestion to correct the article with a native English speaker. Hopefully all of the revisions can be completed within 3-4 weeks.

Regards,  
Bama  
[Quoted text hidden]

---

**Paul Chambers** <pwchambers@gmail.com>  
To: Bama Andika Putra <bama@unhas.ac.id>

Tue, Apr 12, 2022 at 10:10 PM

Dear Bama,  
Thank you. Please take your time.  
Paul

Sent from my iPhone  
[Quoted text hidden]

---

**Bama Andika Putra** <bama@unhas.ac.id>  
To: Paul Chambers <pwchambers@gmail.com>

Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 11:55 PM

Dear Paul Chambers,

Please find attached the revisions for our submitted article. I have made the following changes:  
1. Reformulated the introduction section to include questions on; (1) what is examined, (2) why it is examined, (3) author's arguments, (4) reference to the theory used without deep elaboration,  
2. Corrections to your in-text comments (acronyms, clarification of arguments in the abstract, reference system changed to endnote, paragraphs indented, elimination of the repetitive reference to the theory used),  
3. English errors corrected and proofread by a native speaker.

Attached to this email is two documents, first is the clean version, and second is with tracked changes. Major revisions have been made to fix the English clarity issue that you pointed out. I hope that this version is sufficient enough for publication.


Regards,  
Bama

[Quoted text hidden]

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## 2 attachments

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 **Manuscript\_Bama\_TRACKING.docx**  
2051K

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**Paul Chambers** <pwchambers@gmail.com>  
To: Bama Andika Putra <bama@unhas.ac.id>

Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 1:50 AM

Dear Bama,  
Thank you very much. I will look at this and get back to you.  
Sincerely,  
Paul Chambers  
[Asian Affairs: An American Review](#)

Sent from my iPhone

[Quoted text hidden]

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**2 attachments**

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**Paul Chambers** <pwchambers@gmail.com>  
To: Bama Andika Putra <bama@unhas.ac.id>

Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 11:16 AM

Dear Bama,  
Your paper is looking better but it still needs work.  
Please see my notes in your attached paper.  
1. Specifically, you still need to improve more English but I have improved a lot of it in the paper. Please incorporate my English changes. There are other English problems but I cannot fix them all. In my job as editor of this journal, I am not supposed to correct all English in a submission. Please understand that.  
2. When you have a period or . at the end of a sentence, any " or number comes afterwards. For example, ." not ". Please see an example of our journal. You need to change your sentences.  
3. You need to write your article's argument in the abstract, Introduction and Conclusion. Please see the attached paper.

Please take your time to make the changes.

Cheers and good luck on this,  
Paul Chambers

[Quoted text hidden]

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**Bama Andika Putra** <bama@unhas.ac.id>  
To: Paul Chambers <pwchambers@gmail.com>

Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:04 AM

Dear Paul Chambers,

My apologies for taking some time in completing your recent revision comments. Please find attached the results of my revisions, which incorporates all of your suggestions and responds to your comments.

Regards,  
Bama

[Quoted text hidden]

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 **REV Manuscript\_Bama\_FINAL (1).docx**  
1512K

**Paul Chambers** <pwchambers@gmail.com>  
To: Bama Andika Putra <bama@unhas.ac.id>

Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:52 AM

Dear Bama,  
Thank you very much. We will look at your revisions and be back with you soon.  
Sincerely,  
Paul Chambers

Sent from my iPhone  
[Quoted text hidden]

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 **REV Manuscript\_Bama\_FINAL (1).docx**  
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## Lampiran 2: 3 Ronde Revisi (lengkap dengan komentarnya)

### Revisi Pertama:

#### Reviewer Comments and Revisions

##### Reviewer 1: Major Revision needed

1. author(s) did not display map figuring where border overlapping claims in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Indonesia and Vietnam is.  
: PAGE 4: I have added a map that displays the overlapping EEZ claims between Indonesia and Vietnam  
: PAGE 18: I have added a map to better display the locations of Vietnamese IUUF in Indonesian waters (2021)
2. Author (s) do use 1) kinetic effect, 2) explicitness of messages, 3) balance of power among the countries, 4) policy is reactive or pre-emptive, and 5) sustainment of policy. Why do authors prefer to use this model than other.  
: PAGE 13: I have added a paragraph that justifies the use of Le Miere's 5-points of framework in assessing maritime diplomatic events
3. In Literature Review, page 5 line 38 .... not concise and coherent academic debate on this topic. In short, LR is quite poor to explore the case  
: PAGE 9 & 10: The literature review comprises of two sections. The author commented to the first section of the LR, which is supposed to only provide a general overview on the growing literature of maritime diplomacy. The section that highlights the maritime trends between Indonesia and Vietnam is located in the second section, as the author attempts to display the growing consensus among academia of the Vietnam-Indonesian maritime relations that at times can be perilous.
4. Findings: Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Sea missed data presented in table or statistics. How did data analyzed in the Figure 1. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.  
: PAGE 14: I have added an additional paragraph in the methodology section that provides clarification as to how the radar charts are made. Furthermore, the radar chart is interpreted based on Le Miere's five-point framework, which provides higher points for the following characteristics (kinetic effect, symmetry in global affairs, explicitness of intentions, pre-emptive or reactive policy), and sustainment of the policy.  
: In constructing the radar chart, it does not require a dataset, as it is purely based on the interpretation of the author after analyzing the series of events that transpired in a maritime diplomatic event.

##### Reviewer 2: Reject and Resubmit

1. First, the importance of the analysis is not well explained. The paper states that Vietnam is one of the nations in conflict with Indonesia over illegal fishing disputes. China is mentioned as continuing its aggressive manoeuvres in Indonesian waters (p. 3, line 34). As such, there is the question of how serious the Vietnamese threat really is.  
: PAGE 4: I have added an additional figure that shows the number of Vietnamese fishing vessel intrusions in 2021  
: PAGE 5 & 6: I have added an additional paragraph in the introduction highlighting how the IUUF issue of Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas is a possible deliberate foreign policy of Vietnam to solidify its claims in the overlapping EEZ of Indonesia and Vietnam.
2. Second, there have been several hundred cases of vessels trespassing Indonesian waters, but the study only focuses on five incidents that occurred between 2020 and 2021 (p. 2, line 46). Why only five? Based on what criteria were they selected?  
: PAGE 11: I have added a paragraph justifying the study cases
3. Third, the paper talks about trends in maritime diplomacy, but the authors only analyse five recent cases. How about the other few hundred cases during Jokowi's first presidential term?  
: PAGE 12: I have added a paragraph justifying the time period of 2020-2021.
4. Fourth, the paper doesn't discuss the implications of the results. That is, it is unclear what insight can be obtained through the case study analysis.  
: PAGE 25 & 26: I have added a two-page section focusing on the policy implications of the study cases.

## Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

The bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam have long been tarnished with the unresolved maritime borders surrounding the North Natuna Seas. Despite having a long history of cooperation in multilateral forums such as ASEAN, the rising occurrence of IUUF in the North Natuna Seas perpetrated by Vietnamese flagged-fishing vessels continues to raise concern in Jakarta. This article assesses the maritime diplomatic strategies of Jokowi against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. Five study cases were evaluated based on its maritime diplomatic properties to understand Jokowi's contemporary maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas. The study cases involved Indonesia's responses through raids, capturing, and the seizure of illegal Vietnam fishing boats that infiltrated the North Natuna Seas between 2020-2021 through the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, POLRI or KKP. Through Le Miere's five-points of framework, it is concluded that Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF: 1) heavily consists of kinetic effect, 2) sustainment of policy throughout time (consistent responses), 3) explicitness of message accompanying the maritime diplomatic action, 4) reactive maritime diplomacy rather than pre-emptive, and 5) lack of power balance between stakeholders.

Keywords: maritime diplomacy; North Natuna Seas; IUUF, maritime borders

### Introduction

Overlapping claims in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Indonesia and Vietnam continues to become an irritant to their bilateral relations. Contestations continue to take place in the areas of the North Natuna Seas, where they have not been able to conclude maritime borders related to Vietnam and Indonesia's EEZ (Redu, Cangara, and Putra 2020). Vietnam commences a single boundary for its EEZ and continental shelf, meanwhile, Indonesia is persistent in placing its EEZ and continental shelf as separate entities (Storey 2014). The difficulty in concluding the maritime borders between Indonesia and Vietnam is not as complicated as other maritime boundary tensions in the region. Both countries have signed agreements that would allow more extraordinary confidence-building measures in the context of Vietnam and Indonesian bilateral relations, and specifically in the maritime domain. They agreed on a comprehensive partnership agreement in 2003, and continued with the implementation of a strategic partnership agreement in 2013 (Parameswaran, 2019). Vietnam and Indonesia's commitment to establishing peace amid the tensions at sea are also seen by the vast number of maritime-related agreements concluded, allowing greater collaboration between the countries. Vietnam and Indonesia met in a total of twelve rounds of negotiations from 2010 until 2021 to address the growing concern among the countries on the EEZ delimitation, also on the rise of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) in the North Natuna Seas (a maritime area that collides between Indonesia and Vietnam) (Abbs, 2021). Despite expressed desires to resolve the growing issues, the conflicting legal positions between Indonesia and Vietnam continue to become a significant barrier to any definitive agreement on the matter.

The inability to conclude the limitations in maritime borders has resulted in an increasing number of Vietnam fishing vessels encroaching into Indonesian waters. The number of Vietnam vessels that trespassed Indonesian waters is staggering. From 2014 until 2019 (Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) first presidential term), Indonesia has seized 488 illegal ships that trespassed Indonesian waters, half of them were Vietnamese vessels (Parameswarau 2019). Between 2020 until 2021, interceptions of Vietnamese ships by the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), Indonesian Police (POLRI), the Indonesian Navy, and the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels (KKP) developed to become a common occurrence. Jokowi has implemented a tough stance when it comes to maritime-related affairs of Indonesia (Bama Andika Putra 2021). In 2014, during his inaugural speech, he outlined that the grand strategy of Indonesia was to establish the Global Maritime Axis (GMA), which positions Indonesia as a strategic hub between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Anugrah, Putra, and Burhanuddin 2020). With that, both inward and outward foreign policies utilizing Indonesia's maritime potential have been implemented. One of the highlights of Jokowi's inward maritime-related policies is the increase of connectivity among islands of Indonesia through constructing a sea-based highway (Bama Andika Putra 2020). Meanwhile, as a cornerstone of Jokowi's outward-based policy, he ensured that neighboring countries did not violate Indonesia's territorial sea borders. Indonesia's strictness included the policy of the former KKP minister, Susi Pudjiastuti, in showcasing the deliberate bombing and sinking of illegally trespassing fishing ships captured in various operations (Connolly 2015). It is worth noting that most of the ships captured and sunk in this public showcase originated from Malaysia, Vietnam, and China. Figure 1 illustrates the overlapping EEZ claims between Indonesia and Vietnam, and location of Vietnamese IUUF in the region.




Figure 1: Location of the overlapping EEZ claims between Indonesia and Vietnam (White and Green border lines) and location of the growing Vietnamese IUUF in Indonesian waters in 2021  
Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)

As years passed, the issue of IUUF continued to take place in Indonesian waters. China, for example, has continued its aggressive maneuvers in the North Natuna Seas, utilizing its Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels and other non-military vessels to normalize its claims in the North Natuna Seas. Surprisingly, Vietnam's fishing vessels have also been a major contributor to encroachment in Indonesian waters within these past several years.

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 1:

"author(s) did not display map figuring where border overlapping claims in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Indonesia and Vietnam is"

Revisions:

I have added a map that displays the overlapping EEZ claims between Indonesia and Vietnam

In 2021 alone, the number of IUUF cases from Vietnamese vessels in the North Natuna Seas reached an all-time high of 296 intrusions detected by the Citra Satellite, and 100 intrusions detected by the Automatic Identification System (as shown in figure 2). Despite so, Indonesia has only been able to catch 38 illegally-trespassing vessels from Vietnam, through BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI or the Indonesian Navy (as shown in table 1).




Figure 2: Illegal Vietnam fishing vessel intrusions detected in the North Natuna Seas in 2021 (AIS and Citra Satellite)  
Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022a)

Table 1: The number of Vietnamese fishing vessels captured by Indonesian maritime security law enforcement agencies during 2021

Institution	Number of illegal fishing ships caught
Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery (KKP)	25
Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA)	3
Indonesian Police (POLRI)	8
Indonesian Navy	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>38</b>

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022a)

There seems to be a growing pattern of Vietnam normalizing IUUF in Indonesian waters, which raises a tremendous concern for policymakers in Indonesia. Interestingly, academics have not invested enough in understanding the maritime dynamics in Indonesia's North Natuna Seas. Many have seen that significant dynamics only include Indonesia and China's minor tensions, which includes the involvement of the CCG (Strangio, 2021; Panda 2016). But less analysis has been made to decipher the various maritime diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas.

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR April 12, 2022

Reviewer 2, comment 1:  
"Findings: Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Sea missed data presented in table or statistics. How did data analyzed in the Figure 1. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas."

Revisions:  
I have added an additional figure that shows the number of Vietnamese fishing vessel intrusions in 2021

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Revisions:  
Added additional information of the Vietnamese fishing vessels caught in 2021

The maritime issue between Indonesia and Vietnam should not be taken lightly. In past years, the number of IUUF in the North Natuna Seas, Sulawesi Seas, and the Strait of Malacca have considerably increased (IOJI 2021). Jakarta's concerns towards IUUF are steadily growing with time, as Indonesia views the conduct of IUUF occurring in Indonesian waters as a sign to further invest in patrols and secure Indonesia's sovereignty at sea. In 2017, Jokowi announced the name of the 'North Natuna Seas' as an endeavour to display a tougher stance to the issue of South China Sea and the growing IUUF of Vietnamese and Chinese fishing vessels. Jokowi's policy in solidifying Indonesian rights in the adjacent EEZ is not baseless, following the occurrence of concerning maneuvers in the Pacific Ocean. States have not been hesitant to show their belligerence in the South China Seas, as states have slowly followed China's strategies in expanding their sea boundaries through creating artificial lands and accompanying Chinese fishing vessels through Chinese Coastguards (RFA 2021). Indonesia is thus wary that the act of IUUF is not simply the issue of inexperienced fishermen accidentally infiltrating Indonesian waters, but a case of pre-emptive maritime policy that is carefully constructed to normalize a specific maritime claim in the region. In all the study cases illustrated in this article, Vietnamese fishing vessels that have been apprehended have all been accompanied by VFRS (Vietnam Fisheries Resource Surveillance), indicating a suspicious trend for Indonesian policymakers. It is thus vital to analyze the ongoing cases of IUUF perpetrated by Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas, by investigating the maritime diplomatic characteristics embedded in each study case.

This article assesses Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. Special attention is given to five study cases of Vietnam's illegal fishing boats trespassing the North Natuna Seas that took place in 2021. In constraining the maritime diplomatic strategies and policies of Indonesia, this study utilizes Christian Le Mjère's conception of maritime diplomatic characteristics, including: 1) kinetic effect, 2) explicitness of messages, 3) balance of power among the countries, 4) policy is reactive or pre-emptive, and 5) sustainment of policy. By specifically characterizing each of the study cases to Le Mjère's conception, we can gauge the trends of Indonesia's maritime diplomacy in the North Natuna Seas, specifically in correlation to Vietnam's IUUF and the involvement of its coastguards in several instances.

#### Literature Review

It is worthy to note at the beginning of this literature review that studies on this topic are scarce. To exhibit the deficiencies in this study, the outline of this literature review consists of two major topics; 1) maritime diplomacy, and 2) analysis of Indonesia and Vietnam maritime-related tensions. The first discourse that is related to the topic concerns maritime diplomacy and the development of this study throughout the years. The influence of sea power was initially introduced by a U.S. naval officer and historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan. The main arguments in his early work, 'The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783,' position the U.S. as having immense interests in protecting its vital interests at sea (Mahan 1898). Competition at sea will increase over time, therefore, it was critical for great powers to secure and dominate the sea to achieve specific national interests. Mahan continued to produce writings that were proven to be critical in the study of maritime diplomacy to this day. Despite not directly referencing the terminology of 'maritime diplomacy,' his early works provided the basis of argument on how the sea holds immense potential to be developed and how state actors can better utilize the sea to achieve national interests.

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 2, comment 1:

"Findings: Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Sea missed data presented in table or statistics. How did data analyzed in the Figure 1. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas."

Revisions:

I have added an additional paragraph in the introduction highlighting how the IUUF issue of Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas is a possible deliberate foreign policy of Vietnam to solidify its claims in the overlapping EEZ of Indonesia and Vietnam.

Following the works of Mahan was James Cable's introduction of 'Gunboat Diplomacy.' Gunboat Diplomacy entails that specific national agendas can be achieved through coercive diplomacy, which in this case is through the utilization of navies (Cable 1994; 1989; 1985). Starting from the 20<sup>th</sup> century, academics have analyzed the impact of navies (and other use of sea-based hard power assets) to achieve national interests. A vast majority of studies have specifically referenced study cases from several locations (Alderwick and Gjeigerich 2010; McConnell and Kelly 1973; Percy 2016). However, the most referenced work on maritime diplomacy was Le Mière's work in 2014, entitled 'Maritime Diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Drivers and Challenges.' Le Mière introduced the terminology of 'maritime diplomacy,' along with the threefold typology that continues to be well used by academics in this field; coercive maritime diplomacy, persuasive maritime diplomacy, and cooperative maritime diplomacy (Le Mière 2014). He explained that his writing on the threefold typology of maritime diplomacy aims to capture to a vast extent the diversified forms of maritime diplomatic events, which does not only consist of coercive-based maritime diplomatic actions, as stipulated in past studies of gunboat diplomacy.

However, Le Mière's ultimate contribution to the study is his five-point framework on assessing maritime diplomatic events. He introduced the following assessments in understanding maritime diplomatic events; kinetic effect, the explicitness of messages, sustainable or abbreviated, reactive or pre-emptive, and power balance among conflicting actors (symmetrical or asymmetrical) (Le Mière 2014). The kinetic effect explains the extent of the use of active forces, also in this category, coercive maneuvers in conducting a maritime diplomatic event. Meanwhile, the explicitness of messages depends on whether the aggressor clearly explains the intentions of the maritime diplomatic event or is the message not stated. Sustainability of events focuses on how long a certain operation is conducted or is part of a more extensive operation sustained through a certain period of time. A maritime diplomatic event is considered reactive if the action conducted is only in response to a certain event faced, meanwhile pre-emptive means the conduct of a maritime diplomatic event is not spontaneous, meaning it has been planned in advance. And last, maritime diplomatic events can be characterized as symmetrical or asymmetrical depending on the power balance of the actors in the conflict. If there is a considerable difference in the power of the actors, then it is considered asymmetrical. It is known to be symmetrical if the power balance among the countries is identical.

The second discourse is on Indonesia and Vietnam maritime-related tensions. This section of the literature review excludes any arguments on the bilateral relations of Indonesia and Vietnam and will focus specifically on the bilateral maritime tensions, specifically in the North Natuna Seas. Past studies have majorly focused on the issue of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing taking place in the North Natuna Seas. Amid the rise of maritime-related issues between Indonesia and Vietnam, past studies have addressed the issue of possible solutions to this, such as the possibility of arranging a joint agreement regarding fisheries in the North Natuna Seas (Burhanuddin, Putra, and Cangara 2021; Phan 2021). Furthermore, (Arsyad 2020) was also optimistic in his writing that the issues of IUUF can be addressed effectively with mutual understanding between Vietnam and Indonesia. Special attention has been given to Indonesia's naming of the Natuna Islands becoming the North Natuna Seas and how several neighboring countries such as Vietnam are against it (Zatuliah, Malik, and Radityawara Hidayat 2021). Nevertheless, the most relevant writing to this article is one written by (Sasmita 2021).

She provided solid analysis of the forms of Indonesian maritime diplomacy, based on the threefold typology of Le Mière: coercive, persuasive, and cooperative maritime diplomacy. In conclusion, she stated that Indonesia's form of coercive maritime diplomacy against Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas is through the sinking of Vietnamese fishing ships, formation of bilateral cooperation as a form of cooperative maritime diplomacy, and naval presence as a form of persuasive maritime diplomacy. Despite citing the work of Le Mière and his threefold typology, this article will go further and characterize the numerous cases of maritime diplomatic events that took place in the North Natuna Seas between Indonesia and Vietnam.

As can be seen, the number of literature related to Indonesia and Vietnam's maritime diplomacy in the North Natuna Seas is scarce. A discourse that is relevant to this article but does not directly relate is the maritime diplomatic dynamics of Indonesia and China in the North Natuna Seas. Even though encroachments have been majorly conducted by Vietnamese fishing boats, China's claims in the North Natuna Seas have become more of a dominant discourse among academia. In understanding China's use of coast guards and fishing vessels to trespass Indonesian waters illegally, (Ma'mf. Legionosuko, and Bisman 2020) focused their analysis on Indonesia's calmness in facing a belligerent actor such as China in the North Natuna Seas. Geopolitical analysis of the events has been introduced by (Tampi 2018; Sulistyani, Citra Pertiwi, and Sari 2021), to comprehend further China's unique stance in the North Natuna Seas. But the article that is most relevant in this discourse to the article written is a writing by (Rosana, Dewi, and Agustin 2021), which focuses on China's IUUF strategy in the North Natuna Seas and possible resolutions to the tension.

In conclusion, the study of maritime diplomacy, especially in understanding the maritime diplomatic events in the North Natuna Seas, is understudied. This article will attempt to address the research gap of this by implementing Le Mière's five-point framework in translating the maritime diplomatic events in the North Natuna Seas between Indonesia and Vietnam. Doing this will provide greater clarity as to the trajectory of policies that will take place between the two countries in the North Natuna Seas, in addition to the political dynamics that have unfolded between Indonesia and China in those waters.

#### Methodology

In analyzing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas, this article focuses on five study cases of Vietnam fishing encroachment between 2020-2021. The study cases involve the Indonesian Navy, KKP (Indonesia Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels), and BAKAMLA and how they have responded to Vietnamese-related IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

This article focuses on Indonesia's response to Vietnam IUUF in the North Natuna Seas, therefore, will provide emphasis on Indonesia's response to the actions. Out of the hundreds of Vietnamese intrusions in 2010 and 2021, this article focuses on the cases on the cases caught by the Indonesian maritime security forces only (KKP, BAKAMLA, Indonesian Police, or Indonesian Navy). Furthermore, the five study cases selected represent study cases with similar patterns of actions, which includes; (1) use of destructive fishing practices and overfishing, (2) lack of communication between Vietnam fishing vessels and Indonesian maritime security forces, (3) accompanied by VFRS guarding the fishing vessel, (4) responded by either KKP, BAKAMLA, Indonesian

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 3:

"In Literature Review, page 5 line 38 ... not concise and coherent academic debate on this topic. In short, LR is quite poor to explore the case?"

Revisions:

The literature review comprises of two sections. The author commented to the first section of the LR, which is supposed to only provide a general overview on the growing literature of maritime diplomacy. The section that highlights the maritime trends between Indonesia and Vietnam is located in the second section, as the author attempts to display the growing consensus among academia of the Vietnam-Indonesian maritime relations that at times can be perilous.

police, or Indonesian Navy. Five study cases were chosen as the response by KKP, BAKAMLA, Indonesian Police, or Indonesian Navy has been the same in 2020 and 2021, therefore can represent the hundreds of cases of Vietnamese IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. Furthermore, the study cases would provide an overview of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies in facing Vietnamese illegal IUUF |

It is also pivotal to outline from the outset that the study case chosen is between 2020-2021, which is during Jokowi's second presidential term. This is due to the fact that academics have well interpreted the Indonesian diplomatic strategy in face of Vietnamese IUUF is through coercive means, considering Jokowi's past decisions to not compromise IUUF and conduct publicly-displayed bombardments of the illegally-trespassing vessels (Susilowati, Sulistyono, and Rochwaningsih 2018; Putra 2020). The years 2020 and 2021 thus is a period of time in which Jokowi has slowly retreated from his coercive-based maritime diplomacy strategy, and implemented a more peaceful, yet decisive approach to the IUUF issue in the North Natuna Seas. |

In analyzing Indonesia's responses, this article adopts Le Mièrre's five-points of framework (Le Mièrre 2014) in assessing maritime diplomatic events, which consists of the following maritime diplomatic properties;

1. Kinetic Effect: By assessing whether a maritime diplomatic event is kinetic or non-kinetic, it will signal to adversaries the significance of the objective at stake. A tendency of using military forces, and coercive actions such as aggressive maneuvers, targeted violence, and warning shots across the bow, indicates a significant kinetic effect.
2. Symmetry or Asymmetry: Maritime diplomatic events categorized as asymmetrical entail that a more potent power is enforcing its abilities to establish changes to a certain policy (the balance of power is unequal among the aggressors). Meanwhile, symmetrical indicates equality in the balance of power.
3. Message is explicit, implicit, or unspoken messages: In the conduct of maritime diplomatic events, a protagonist will clarify its intent through the messages sent as an attempt to make clear a protagonist's main intentions. Explicitness in messages allows, for example, a minimum room for miscommunication, indicating a resolve based on the preferences of the announcer. Implicit messages can be dangerous, as it opens room for miscalculation and misinterpretation of messages. Meanwhile, unspoken messages are viewed more as a strategic move for a protagonist to keep all available options open for negotiations in the future.
4. Pre-emptive or reactive: A pre-emptive maritime diplomatic event has been planned in advance with certain goals that are targeted. Meanwhile, reactive maritime diplomatic events usually are impromptu without proper long-term planning.
5. Sustained or abbreviated: This maritime diplomatic property assesses the question of how long certain maritime events have been conducted throughout time.

This article perceives that Le Mièrre's five-points of framework provides a strong analysis as to the trajectory of future maritime policies. The Indo-Pacific region is currently a place of geostrategic and geopolitical shifts, with rising tensions among regional hegemony. The growing tensions in the past decade have led to misperception and miscalculation of state policies among littoral and non-littoral states, therefore it is pivotal to have a vivid analysis as to state actions in the region. By adopting Le Mièrre's five-points of framework, policymakers are provided enlightenment as to several key domains to

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 2, comment 2:

"Second, there have been several hundred cases of vessels trespassing Indonesian waters, but the study only focuses on five incidents that occurred between 2020 and 2021 (p. 2, line 46). Why only five? Based on what criteria were they selected?"

Revisions:

I have added a paragraph justifying the study cases

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 2, comment 3:

"Third, the paper talks about trends in maritime diplomacy, but the authors only analyse five recent cases. How about the other few hundred cases during Jokowi's first presidential term?"

Revisions:

I have added a paragraph justifying the time period of 2020-2021.

maritime policies conducted by actors, including the true intentions of initially perceived coercive maneuvers in order to advance a state's adaptational ability towards maritime policies alike in the future. Furthermore, this mechanism assists states in steering clear of possible miscalculations and misperception of state maneuvers at sea, which is a critical element to hinder from escalation of conflicts.

In assessing the maritime diplomatic properties of the five study cases, a radar chart is displayed to illustrate the extent of each maritime characteristic further. This qualitative study utilizes primary and secondary data related to Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies in responding to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas in 2020-2021. The illustrations in the radar charts are made based on the following explanation:

1. Kinetic Effects: Points are given based on the extent of active forces and military equipments used in the event, and that the initial interpreted intentions are hostile.
2. Symmetry: Points are given if the level of power among the conflicting states are similar based on one's influence in global affairs.
3. Explicitness: Points are given based on the presence of clear communications during the event, highlighting the intentions of the actions.
4. Pre-emption or Reactive: Points are given if the event is pre-emptive, meaning that the conduct is planned and not a form of an impromptu response.
5. Sustainment: Points are given based on a policy's level of continuation.

### Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

In Jokowi's first presidential term, he did not make any compromises to cases of IUUF in any parts of the Indonesian maritime borders. Through the then Minister of Fisheries of Maritime Affairs, Susi Pudjiastu, Indonesia successfully securitized any actions of IUUF through public bombings of the captured illegal fishing vessels (B A Putra 2020). Following Jokowi's second presidential term, Indonesia took a different approach in responding to cases of sea-based encroachments. Jokowi has been soft by capturing and seizing illegal fishing boats but not undergoing the same policy of public bombings as a deterrent effect. This article employs Le Mier's five-points of framework in assessing Indonesia's contemporary maritime diplomatic events concerning Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. In assessing this, the article will focus on the following study cases:

1. BAKAMLA chase down of Vietnam fishing boats, July 2020,
2. Indonesian Navy apprehension of two Vietnam fishing boats, October 2020
3. Vietnam vessel bearing the Indonesian flag captured by BAKAMLA, December 2020,
4. Five Vietnam fishing boats seized by KKP, April 2021
5. KKP, April 2021 captured two Vietnam fishing boats

The study cases above will then be analyzed on the criteria of kinetic effect, the explicitness of the messages sent, sustained or abbreviated, reactive or pre-emptive, and the power balance among the actors (symmetrical or asymmetrical).

The majority of fishing vessel encroachments into Indonesian waters originate from Vietnam. Because of the many cases of illegal trespassing into the North Natuna Seas, Vietnam, through its fishing boats, is trying to normalize its claims over their version of the EEZ, which collides with Indonesia's claim over the North Natuna Seas. Indonesia's stakeholders that have been active in the process of seizing, capturing, and escorting these

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 2:

"Author (s) do use 1) kinetic effect, 2) explicitness of messages, 3) balance of power among the countries, 4) policy is reactive or pre-emptive, and 5) sustainment of policy. Why do authors prefer to use this model than other."

Revisions:

I have added a paragraph that justifies the use of Le Mier's 5-points of framework in assessing maritime diplomatic events

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 4:

"Findings: Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Sea missed data presented in table or statistics. How did data analyzed in the Figure 1. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas."

Revisions:

1. I have added an additional paragraph in the methodology section that provides clarification as to how the radar charts are made. Furthermore, the radar chart is interpreted based on Le Mier's five-point framework, which provides higher points for the following characteristics (kinetic effect, symmetry in global affairs, explicitness of intentions, pre-emptive or reactive policy), and sustainment of the policy.
2. In constructing the radar chart, it does not require a dataset, as it is purely based on the interpretation of the author after analyzing the series of events that transpired in a maritime diplomatic event.

fishing vessels out of Indonesian waters are the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP. As Indonesia is slowly moving forward from a coercive-based maritime diplomatic reaction of publicly bombarding illegal fishing vessels that trespass Indonesian waters, a further assessment is needed in investigating contemporary maritime diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas.

Most of the study cases presented in this article consist of the illegal trespassing of Vietnamese fishing vessels in the North Natuna Seas. In July 2020, BAKAMLA chased down a Vietnamese fishing boat that maneuvered around the North Natuna Seas (Eadli 2020b). Sailors of the boat endeavored to avoid arrest by speeding away during the chase down with BAKAMLA and discarded their fishing nets. They were desperate as they continued to conduct zig-zag maneuvers that were dangerous for other vessels in the area, as well as burned tires to minimize vision. BAKAMLA's patrol boat, the KN Pulau Dana-323, initially communicated with the fishing vessel but attained no response. Furthermore, they maneuvered around the fishing vessel and alerted them through semaphore signals but did not attain any response. As a last resort, BAKAMLA decided to take warning shots into the air, then on the fishing boat platform as a final warning. The fishing crew then were arrested along with 2 tons of illegally caught fish (Eadli 2020b).

The second study case involved the Indonesian Navy and their apprehension of 2 Vietnam fishing boats that sailed along the North Natuna Seas in October 2020. The 2 Vietnam fishing boats conducted illegal fishing into Indonesia's continental shelf, igniting the Indonesian Navy's response. Indonesia's KRI John Lie-358 managed to undergo a one-hour chase down with Vietnam's fishing vessels BV0908TS and BV499TS, as the fishing boats trespassed into Indonesian waters (TNI-AL 2020). The event took place at midnight, and Vietnam's fishing vessels turned off their lights and released their fishing nets. The Indonesian Navy continuously gave warnings to stop, fired warning shots, and was then able to conduct a visit board search and seizure. In an official statement by the Indonesian Navy, it was stated that Indonesia's responses here are part of the Operation Koarmada I Marine Combat Group, which embraced the commitment to protecting Indonesian waters despite facing hardships in operations during pandemic times (TNI-AL 2020).

BAKAMLA was again involved in the third study case against a Vietnamese fishing vessel bearing the Indonesian flag in December 2020. As an attempt to trick Indonesian authorities, BAKAMLA encountered a fishing vessel in December 2020 that maneuvered illegally in Indonesia's North Natuna Seas. The Vietnam vessel BT 95212 had at their disposal 2 tons of fish and dried shark fins with no proper fishing documents at hand (Eadli 2020a). As an attempt to not get captured, BAKAMLA stated that they attempted to display the Indonesian flag to avoid possible raids by the Indonesian authorities.

The last two study cases involved Indonesia's KKP, specifically, vessels under the Directorate General of Marine and Fishery Resources Supervision. The first study case took place in April 2021, with Indonesia's KKP capturing five illegal Vietnam fishing boats at the same time (Aprian 2021). Vietnam's fishing boats had squid as their primary commodity target and decided to flee when approached by Indonesian officials. Secretary-General of the Ministry of Maritime and Affairs and Fisheries, Anton Novanbar, stated that capturing the five illegally trespassing fishing boats is a form of commitment by the Indonesian government not to compromise any forms of illegal

activity fishing in Indonesian waters (Aptian, 2021). Furthermore, due to the recent capturing that took place, Indonesia is strengthening its surveillance capabilities in the North Natuna Seas, Malacca Strait, and North Sulawesi Sea.

The last study case took place in April 2021, with KKP arresting 2 Vietnam vessels poaching in the North Natuna Seas. The patrol ship of Orca 03 managed to detain the fishing boats of KG 9307 TS and KNF 7727 after they were caught tugging their pair trawl to catch fish (Rahman and Haryati, 2021). After the event, Indonesia's KKP continued to emphasize the importance of not conducting illegal fishing in Indonesian waters and that the KKP will continue to be active in making sure illegal poaching continues to be responded not lightly.




Figure 3: Location of the Vietnamese vessels in April 2021  
Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)

### Assessing the maritime diplomatic characteristics of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

As illustrated in the previous section, Indonesia has responded to cases of Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas through its Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP (depending on the site of which the vessels are captured). Indonesia's contemporary maritime diplomatic strategies have shifted and are no longer oriented to the traditional coercive public displaying of destroying illegal shipping boats. If assessed based on Le Miere's five-points of framework, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas consists of a considerably significant kinetic effect, sustainment of policy throughout time (consistent responses), explicitness in the message accompanying the maritime diplomatic action, reactive in nature, as well as the absence of power balance between Vietnam and Indonesia, which allows Indonesia to

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 1:  
"author(s) did not display map figuring where border overlapping claims in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Indonesia and Vietnam is"

Revisions:  
I have added a map to better display the locations of Vietnamese IUUF in Indonesian waters (2021)

limited coercive pathway, it reflects Indonesia's willingness to fully claim the North Natuna Seas and not be flexible with future negotiations with Vietnam. Despite much optimism that Indonesia and Vietnam will compromise the issue of the EEZ and continental shelf that collides in the North Natuna Seas, this article believes that the asymmetrical power difference will make Indonesia enforce their preference of no tolerations in the delimitation of their sovereign waters.

In all study cases presented, clear indications of the policy being sustained throughout time are well present. The utilization of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP regularly operating in the EEZ of Indonesia is a common policy for Indonesia. What occurred in recent times is the decrease of coerciveness in cases of IUUF. In Jokowi's first presidential term, the focus was on establishing a deterrent effect through the bombings of illegal fishing vessels through public display. That is no longer a policy conducted by Indonesia due to the public backlash it attained from neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. But the decrease of coerciveness does not indicate that the policy implemented now, which consists of strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, and warning shots, constitutes as a newly introduced policy. The contemporary actions by Indonesian officials can still be considered as sustainable, as it is an extension of past similar policies in an attempt to decrease IUUF in Indonesian sovereign waters. Therefore, despite differing with past coercive levels conducted as an Indonesian maritime diplomatic strategy, the strategy itself is sustained, thus a clear attestation to Indonesia's commitment to its North Natuna Sea policy.

The last maritime diplomatic property that is assessed is whether the study cases fall under the category of pre-emptive or reactive. Maritime diplomatic events that fall under the category of pre-emptive maritime diplomacy reflect that certain policies have been planned long in advance to achieve a certain goal. As the policy is sustained and pre-emptively prepared, the protagonist (in this case, Indonesia) is confident about its possible outcome due to its unmoved stance. Maritime diplomatic events characterized as reactive means that it is conducted based on an impromptu nature. Events under this category are subjected to possibilities of uncertainties, as reactive maritime diplomacy does not give sufficient time to prepare and plan actions in advance, leading to a lack of ability to map possible scenarios to a certain outcome of an event. Le Mièrte stated that reactive maritime diplomacy opens bigger possibilities of events evolving to become more dangerous and escalatory.

It is with no doubt that the study cases on Indonesia's maritime diplomatic policies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas are reactive. Indonesia continued its policies of strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, and warning shots against Vietnam's IUUF, which are conducted as a form of response towards the trespassing of fishing ships in Indonesian waters. Indonesia's reactive maritime diplomacy established greater uncertainties as to the orientation of the situations in the study cases. That is why in several study cases, Indonesian officials encountered fishing boats that attempted to fool Indonesian officials by bearing the Indonesian flag, turning off their lights at midnight, and to the use of aggressive maneuvers. Le Mièrte stated that reactive policies tend to be more dangerous due to the uncertainties and possibility of escalation that may occur. To a certain extent, the crisis in the North Natuna Seas increased as most of the responses by the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP had to be impromptu and based on instinct. However, there is a line that Indonesian officials have not exceeded, despite their actions being reactive maritime diplomacy. That line is

All of the study cases reflect Indonesia's explicitness in sending the message of Indonesia's claims in the North Natuna Seas. Officials directly state the messages during the crisis and post-event, in which the actions of Indonesia, aims, resolve, and the consequences of violating its territory were clearly transmitted to Vietnam vessels. Based on this category, the medium, which is the utilization of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP fishing vessels that operate throughout Indonesia's EEZ and continental shelf, is a clear indication of Indonesia's intent to normalize its North Natuna Sea claims. So in the factors of the medium, the active presence of Indonesian officials is the message itself. Regarding the substantive message, in all of the study cases listed, Indonesian officials have been straightforward in explaining how Vietnam vessels have illegally trespassed Indonesian waters, the North Natuna Seas. So despite inconclusive meetings between Indonesia and Vietnam in figuring out how to resolve the issue of EEZ and continental shelf boundaries among the two countries, Indonesia consistently implements a policy that normalizes its claims in the overall waters of the North Natuna Seas.

The study cases' explicitness of Indonesia's message shows that the message itself cannot be misconstrued or misinterpreted in any form possible. It thus makes it difficult for other stakeholders to implement a stance against it and further puts Indonesia at an advantage as Indonesia avoids unnecessary escalation of conflicts to take place. The trajectory of Indonesia's stance construed by its message also signifies how it will be difficult for Indonesia to be flexible in future negotiations related to the North Natuna Seas, as the stance has been clearly stated. Indonesia is confident with its claims in the North Natuna Seas, and the explicitness displayed indicates possible future resolve under the preference of Indonesia. Despite the varying intensity, all five study cases indicate a strong element of explicitness in the messages sent. The intensity of explicitness in study cases involving KKP is considered less compared to those related to the Indonesian Navy and BAKAMLA, as KKP strictly disseminates the message of fishing-related activities only, not the overall security of the North Natuna Seas, such as the rhetoric used by the Indonesian Navy and BAKAMLA.

Assessing the power balance among the countries involved in the IUUF can determine the future possibilities on stability and motivations of the countries. To achieve peace, it is ideal for the countries' intention to be of the same power, meaning the power balance factor is present. Vietnam and Indonesia's power balance is asymmetrical, meaning the power balance is not equal. This puts Indonesia at an advantage, as when negotiations are conducted, they can exert their interests to be implemented in agreements. Indonesia in Southeast Asia is superior to Vietnam, reflected by its GDP, military size, population, and ability to introduce international norms to regional organizations such as ASEAN. Indonesia has been, to a limited extent, coercive in facing illegal Vietnamese fishing ships in the North Natuna Seas. They have not been hesitant in showing that the waters belong to Indonesia, and the perpetrators of the violations of international law will be tried in accordance.

In all study cases involving Vietnam fishing vessels, it is clearly seen that the consequence of an unequal power balance shows great consequences. As explained by Le Mière in his writings, the presence of an asymmetrical power balance will result in a stronger power to enforce its policy references to the weaker country, and this is feasible due to their relatively higher power in comparison to the other. As Indonesia is the stronger power perpetrating the conduct of protecting its sovereign waters through a

compel its will in the emerging study cases. An illustration of the extent of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic properties across the five study cases can be seen in figure 4.




Figure 4. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

In the point of kinetic effect, the study cases tend to indicate an average to a significant level of kinetic effect in Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies in the North Natuna Seas against Vietnam's IUUF. As stated in past sections of this article, a significant kinetic effect will signal to adversaries how important is the objective at stake. Indonesia, through its Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP, shows that Indonesia is willing to go to an extensive extent to protect its sovereignty at sea. Study cases that involved BAKAMLA and the Indonesian Navy represent the tough stance of Indonesia through the use of strategies aimed to compel adversaries to alter their actions. Warning shots to the air and in the ship platforms have been used in the study cases and aggressive maneuvers to stop the actions of IUUF that took place in the study cases. The intentionality of striking the target solidifies Indonesia's intentions of protecting its sovereignty and shows the importance of protecting the North Natuna Seas for Indonesia.

However, the last two study cases indicated a decline of kinetic effect conducted by Indonesian officials. Through the Indonesian KKP, aspects of kinetic effect were not absent but majorly suppressed compared to previous study cases mentioned. Previous study cases consisted of active use of military forces with the conduct of coercive actions, including blockage, prevention of an adversary's movement, and warning shots. Meanwhile, study cases involving the KKP lacked this similar form, as their main concern here is the action of blocking, capturing, and seizing ships that have illegally trespassed Indonesian waters. Actions by the KKP thus still contain kinetic effects to a certain extent, but not as significant as the study cases involving the Indonesian Navy and BAKAMLA. In conclusion, the dominant kinetic effect in Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies in the North Natuna Seas indicates Indonesia's intent to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas by upholding international law and its desire to avoid futile conflicts with the opposing stakeholder.

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not to exceed their traditional forms of coerciveness in handling illegal ship poaching in the North Natuna Seas.

#### Policy Implication

In the mid of the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific, state actors have become wary of coercive maneuvers at sea. Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas contains a number of pivotal policy implications for regional security in the region. It is worthy to note that unlike China's sustained maneuvers in the South China Sea, or the US Freedom of Navigation in the Pacific Oceans, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy in facing Vietnamese IUUF is categorized as reactive. Therefore, the conduct of strict patrols by BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, and the Indonesian Navy, aggressive maneuvers, and warning shots against Vietnam's IUUF vessels, is a form of response towards trespassing of fishing ships in Indonesian waters. It is thus a possibility that in certain intrusion cases in the future, Indonesia will showcase greater coerciveness in protecting its sea territory. However, Indonesia has never acted to the point that it violates existing international laws and regulations.

This uncertainty is also contributed by the lack of power balance between Vietnam and Indonesia. Indonesia displayed a more straightforward and coercive response to the IUUF vessels from Vietnam, but has basically become more reluctant to respond the same with fishing vessels from China. Indonesian forces are not reluctant in the conduct of their maritime diplomatic strategies considering that they are in a position to exert their interests against Vietnam. Therefore, if Vietnam and Indonesia fail to conclude the UNCLOS provisional agreement on their overlapping EEZ claims, it would not become a surprise that Indonesia will continue compelling Vietnam away from Indonesia's EEZ.

Nevertheless, in the domains of kinetic effect, sustainment, and explicitness, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy against Vietnam IUUF is considered consistent. They have always been explicit in their message that they coerce foreign ships as they violate Indonesia's EEZ, have used military means to compel adversaries to alter their actions, and conducted sustainable operations at sea through the Indonesian sea law enforcement including BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, and the Indonesian Navy. A strong point of recommendation for this though, is that all of the Indonesian bodies need to work in synergy to counter cases of IUUF, especially that originating from Vietnam.

#### Conclusion

Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas has evolved with time. Jokowi has reoriented his policies to one that is more accommodative to its neighboring state's voices of decreasing Indonesia's level of coerciveness at sea. What was once a public display of the bombings of illegal ships, Indonesia has focused now on its maritime capacities to undergo its traditional role of strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, and warning shots against any illegal ship that trespasses Indonesian sovereign waters. The bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam have long been tarnished by the presence of the unresolved maritime borders in the North Natuna Seas. Despite having a long history of cooperation in multilateral forums such as ASEAN, the rising occurrence of IUUF in the North Natuna Seas perpetrated by Vietnamese flagged-fishing vessels continues to raise concern in Jakarta.

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 2, comment 4:

"Fourth, the paper doesn't discuss the implications of the results. That is, it is unclear what insight can be obtained through the case study analysis."

Revisions:

I have added a section focusing on the policy implications of the study cases.

This article assesses the maritime diplomatic strategies of Jokowi against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. Five study cases were evaluated based on its maritime diplomatic properties in order to understand Jokowi's contemporary maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas. The study cases involved raids, capturing, and seizures of illegal Vietnam fishing boats that infiltrated the North Natuna Seas between 2020-2021. Each study case was responded well by the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, or KKP. As a result, it is clearly shown that Indonesia is signaling its intent to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas but is willing to avoid needless conflicts at sea. Through Le Miere's five-points of framework, it is concluded that Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF; 1) heavily consists of kinetic effect, 2) sustainment of policy throughout time (consistent responses), 3) Indonesian message is explicitly stated accompanying the maritime diplomatic action, 4) reactive maritime diplomacy, rather than pre-emptive, and 5) lack of power balance between stakeholders.

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## Balasan Revisi Pertama:

### Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

The bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam have long been tarnished by the unresolved maritime borders surrounding the North Natuna Seas. Despite having a long history of cooperation in multilateral forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the rising occurrence of IUUF in the North Natuna Seas perpetrated by Vietnamese flagged-fishing vessels continues to raise concern in Jakarta. This article assesses the maritime diplomatic strategies of Jokowi against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. Though there have been hundreds of incidents, five study cases were evaluated based on their maritime diplomatic properties to understand Jokowi's contemporary maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas. The study cases involved Indonesia's responses through raids, capturing, and the seize of illegal Vietnam fishing boats that infiltrated the North Natuna Seas between 2020-2021 through the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, POLRI or KKP. Through Le Mière's five-points of framework, it is concluded that Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF; 1) heavily consists of kinetic effect, 2) sustainment of policy throughout time (consistent responses), 3) explicitness of message accompanying the maritime diplomatic action, 4) reactive maritime diplomacy rather than pre-emptive, and 5) lack of power balance between stakeholders.

Keywords: maritime diplomacy; North Natuna Seas; IUUF, maritime borders

#### Introduction

Overlapping claims in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Indonesia and Vietnam continues to become an irritant to their bilateral relations. Contestations continue to take place in the areas of the North Natuna Seas, where they have not been able to conclude maritime borders related to Vietnam and Indonesia's EEZ (Beddu, Cangara, and Putra 2020). Vietnam commences a single boundary for its EEZ and continental shelf, meanwhile, Indonesia is persistent in placing its EEZ and continental shelf as separate entities (Storey 2014). The difficulty in concluding the maritime borders between Indonesia and Vietnam is not as complicated as other maritime boundary tensions in the region. Both countries have signed agreements that would allow more extraordinary confidence-building measures in the context of Vietnam and Indonesian bilateral relations, and specifically in the maritime domain. They agreed on a comprehensive partnership agreement in 2003, and continued with the implementation of a strategic partnership agreement in 2013 (Parameswaran 2019). Vietnam and Indonesia's commitment to establishing peace amid the tensions at sea are also seen by the vast number of maritime-related agreements concluded, allowing greater collaboration between the countries. Vietnam and Indonesia met in a total of twelve rounds of negotiations from 2010 until 2021 to address the growing concern among the countries on the EEZ delimitation, also on the rise of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) in the North Natuna Seas (a maritime area that collides between Indonesia and Vietnam) (Abke 2021). Despite expressed desires to resolve the growing issues, the conflicting legal positions between Indonesia and Vietnam continue to become a significant barrier to any definitive agreement on the matter. The inability to conclude the limitations in maritime borders has resulted in an increasing number of Vietnam fishing vessels encroaching into Indonesian waters. The number of

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Vietnam vessels that trespassed Indonesian waters is staggering. From 2014 until 2019 (Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) first presidential term), Indonesia has seized 488 illegal ships that trespassed Indonesian waters, half of them were Vietnamese vessels (Parameswaran 2019). Between 2020 until 2021, interceptions of Vietnamese ships by the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), Indonesian Police (POLRI), the Indonesian Navy, and the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels (KKP) developed to become a common occurrence. Jokowi has implemented a tough stance when it comes to maritime-related affairs of Indonesia (Bama Andika Putra 2021). In 2014, during his inaugural speech, he outlined that the grand strategy of Indonesia was to establish the Global Maritime Axis (GMA), which positions Indonesia as a strategic hub between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Anugerah, Putra, and Burhanuddin 2020). With that, both inward and outward foreign policies utilizing Indonesia's maritime potential have been implemented. One of the highlights of Jokowi's inward maritime-related policies is the increase of connectivity among islands of Indonesia through constructing a sea-based highway (Bama Andika Putra 2020). Meanwhile, as a cornerstone of Jokowi's outward-based policy, he ensured that neighboring countries did not violate Indonesia's territorial sea borders. Indonesia's strictness included the policy of the former KKP minister, Susi Pudjiastuti, in showcasing the deliberate bombing and sinking of illegally trespassing fishing ships captured in various operations (Connolly 2015). It is worth noting that most of the ships captured and sunk in this public showcase originated from Malaysia, Vietnam, and China. Figure 1 illustrates the overlapping EEZ claims between Indonesia and Vietnam, and location of Vietnamese IUUF in the region.




Figure 1: Location of the overlapping EEZ claims between Indonesia and Vietnam (White and Green border lines) and location of the growing Vietnamese IUUF in Indonesian waters in 2021

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)

As years passed, the issue of IUUF continued to take place in Indonesian waters. China, for example, has continued its aggressive maneuvers in the North Natuna Seas, utilizing its Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels and other non-military vessels to normalize its claims in the North Natuna Seas. Surprisingly, Vietnam's fishing vessels have also been a major contributor to encroachment in Indonesian waters within these past several years. In 2021 alone, the number of IUUF cases from Vietnamese vessels in the North Natuna Seas reached an all-time high of 296 intrusions detected by the Citra Satellite, and 100

Paul Chambers

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Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 1:

"author(s) did not display map figuring where border overlapping claims in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Indonesia and Vietnam is"

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I have added a map that displays the overlapping EEZ claims between Indonesia and Vietnam

Bama Andika Putra

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intrusions detected by the Automatic Identification System (as shown in figure 2). Despite so, Indonesia has only been able to catch 38 illegally-trespassing vessels from Vietnam, through BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI or the Indonesian Navy (as shown in table 1).




Figure 2: Illegal Vietnam fishing vessel intrusions detected in the North Natuna Seas in 2021 (AIS and Citra Satellite)

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022a)

Table 1: The number of Vietnamese fishing vessels captured by Indonesian maritime security law enforcement agencies during 2021

Institution	Number of illegal fishing ships caught
Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery (KKP)	25
Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA)	3
Indonesian Police (POLRI)	8
Indonesian Navy	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>38</b>

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022a)

There seems to be a growing pattern of Vietnam normalizing IUUF in Indonesian waters, which raises a tremendous concern for policymakers in Indonesia. Interestingly, academics have not invested enough in understanding the maritime dynamics in Indonesia's North Natuna Seas. Many have seen that significant dynamics only include Indonesia and China's minor tensions, which includes the involvement of the CCG (Suangio 2021; Panda 2016). But less analysis has been made to decipher the various maritime diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas.

The maritime issue between Indonesia and Vietnam should not be taken lightly. In past years, the number of IUUF in the North Natuna Seas, Sulawesi Seas, and the Strait of Malacca have considerably increased (IOJI 2021). Jakarta's concerns towards IUUF are

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 2, comment 1:

"Findings: Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Sea missed data presented in table or statistics. How did data analyzed in the Figure 1. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas."

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Added additional information of the Vietnamese fishing vessels caught in 2021

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steadily growing with time, as Indonesia views the conduct of IUUF occurring in Indonesian waters as a sign to further invest in patrols and secure Indonesia's sovereignty at sea. In 2017, Jokowi announced the name of the 'North Natuna Seas' as an endeavour to display a tougher stance to the issue of South China Sea and the growing IUUF of Vietnamese and Chinese fishing vessels. Jokowi's policy in solidifying Indonesian rights in the adjacent EEZ is not baseless, following the occurrence of concerning maneuvers in the Pacific Ocean. States have not been hesitant to show their belligerence in the South China Seas, as states have slowly followed China's strategies in expanding their sea boundaries through creating artificial lands and accompanying Chinese fishing vessels through Chinese Coastguards (RFA 2021). Indonesia is thus wary that the act of IUUF is not simply the issue of inexperienced fishermen accidentally infiltrating Indonesian waters, but a case of pre-emptive maritime policy that is carefully constructed to normalize a specific maritime claim in the region. In all the study cases illustrated in this article, Vietnamese fishing vessels that have been apprehended have all been accompanied by VFRS (Vietnam Fisheries Resource Surveillance), indicating a suspicious trend for Indonesian policymakers. It is thus vital to analyze the ongoing cases of IUUF perpetrated by Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas, by investigating the maritime diplomatic characteristics embedded in each study case.

This study assesses Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. Special attention is given to five study cases of Vietnam's illegal fishing boats trespassing the North Natuna Seas that took place in 2021. In construing the maritime diplomatic strategies and policies of Indonesia, this study utilizes Christian Le Mière's conception of maritime diplomatic characteristics, including; 1) kinetic effect, 2) explicitness of messages, 3) balance of power among the countries, 4) policy is reactive or pre-emptive, and 5) sustainment of policy. By specifically characterizing each of the study cases to Le Mière's conception, we can gauge the trends of Indonesia's maritime diplomacy in the North Natuna Seas, specifically in correlation to Vietnam's IUUF and the involvement of its coastguards in several instances.

#### Literature Review

It is worthy to note at the beginning of this literature review that studies on this topic are scarce. To exhibit the deficiencies in this study, the outline of this literature review consists of two major topics; 1) maritime diplomacy, and 2) analysis of Indonesia and Vietnam maritime-related tensions. The first discourse that is related to the topic concerns maritime diplomacy and the development of this study throughout the years. The influence of sea power was initially introduced by a U.S. naval officer and historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan. The main arguments in his early work, 'The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783,' position the U.S. as having immense interests in protecting its vital interests at sea (Mahan 1898). Competition at sea will increase over time, therefore, it was critical for great powers to secure and dominate the sea to achieve specific national interests. Mahan continued to produce writings that were proven to be critical in the study of maritime diplomacy to this day. Despite not directly referencing the terminology of 'maritime diplomacy,' his early works provided the basis of argument on how the sea holds immense potential to be developed and how state actors can better utilize the sea to achieve national interests.

Following the works of Mahan was James Cable's introduction of 'Gunboat Diplomacy.' Gunboat Diplomacy entails that specific national agendas can be achieved through

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 2, comment 1:

"Findings: Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Sea missed data presented in table or statistics. How did data analyzed in the Figure 1. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas."

Revisions:

I have added an additional paragraph in the introduction highlighting how the IUUF issue of Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas is a possible deliberate foreign policy of Vietnam to solidify its claims in the overlapping EEZ of Indonesia and Vietnam.

Paul Chambers

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Paul Chambers

This sentence is way back on page 6. It should be one of the first sentences of the introduction.

Remember, in your introduction, you need to first tell the reader what your paper is about and what is the relevance of examining the subject. Example: "This study examines..."

Paul Chambers

All paragraphs should be indented

coercive diplomacy, which in this case is through the utilization of navies (Cable 1994; 1989; 1985). Starting from the 20<sup>th</sup> century, academics have analyzed the impact of navies (and other use of sea-based hard power assets) to achieve national interests. A vast majority of studies have specifically referenced study cases from several locations (Alderwick and Giegerich, 2010; McConnell and Kelly 1973; Percy 2016). However, the most referenced work on maritime diplomacy was Le Mièrte's work in 2014, entitled 'Maritime Diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Drivers and Challenges.' Le Mièrte introduced the terminology of 'maritime diplomacy,' along with the threefold typology that continues to be well used by academics in this field; coercive maritime diplomacy, persuasive maritime diplomacy, and cooperative maritime diplomacy (Le Mièrte 2014). He explained that his writing on the threefold typology of maritime diplomacy aims to capture to a vast extent the diversified forms of maritime diplomatic events, which does not only consist of coercive-based maritime diplomatic actions, as stipulated in past studies of gunboat diplomacy.

However, Le Mièrte's ultimate contribution to the study is his five-point framework on assessing maritime diplomatic events. He introduced the following assessments in understanding maritime diplomatic events; kinetic effect, the explicitness of messages, sustainable or abbreviated, reactive or pre-emptive, and power balance among conflicting actors (symmetrical or asymmetrical) (Le Mièrte 2014). The kinetic effect explains the extent of the use of active forces, also in this category, coercive maneuvers in conducting a maritime diplomatic event. Meanwhile, the explicitness of messages depends on whether the aggressor clearly explains the intentions of the maritime diplomatic event or is the message not stated. Sustainability of events focuses on how long a certain operation is conducted or is part of a more extensive operation sustained through a certain period of time. A maritime diplomatic event is considered reactive if the action conducted is only in response to a certain event faced, meanwhile pre-emptive means the conduct of a maritime diplomatic event is not spontaneous, meaning it has been planned in advance. And last, maritime diplomatic events can be characterized as symmetrical or asymmetrical depending on the power balance of the actors in the conflict. If there is a considerable difference in the power of the actors, then it is considered asymmetrical. It is known to be symmetrical if the power balance among the countries is identical.

The second discourse is on Indonesia and Vietnam maritime-related tensions. This section of the literature review excludes any arguments on the bilateral relations of Indonesia and Vietnam and will focus specifically on the bilateral maritime tensions, specifically in the North Natuna Seas. Past studies have majorly focused on the issue of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing taking place in the North Natuna Seas. Amid the rise of maritime-related issues between Indonesia and Vietnam, past studies have addressed the issue of possible solutions to this, such as the possibility of arranging a joint agreement regarding fisheries in the North Natuna Seas (Burhanuddin, Putra, and Cangara, 2021; Phan 2021). Furthermore, (Arsyad, 2020) was also optimistic in his writing that the issues of IUUF can be addressed effectively with mutual understanding between Vietnam and Indonesia. Special attention has been given to Indonesia's naming of the Natuna Islands becoming the North Natuna Seas and how several neighboring countries such as Vietnam are against it (Zatullah, Malik, and Radityawara Hidayat, 2021). Nevertheless, the most relevant writing to this article is one written by (Sasmita, 2021). She provided solid analysis of the forms of Indonesian maritime diplomacy, based on the threefold typology of Le Mièrte; coercive, persuasive, and cooperative maritime diplomacy. In conclusion, she stated that Indonesia's form of coercive maritime

diplomacy against Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas is through the sinking of Vietnamese fishing ships, formation of bilateral cooperation as a form of cooperative maritime diplomacy, and naval presence as a form of persuasive maritime diplomacy. Despite citing the work of Le Mière and his threefold typology, this article will go further and characterize the numerous cases of maritime diplomatic events that took place in the North Natuna Seas between Indonesia and Vietnam.

As can be seen, the number of literature related to Indonesia and Vietnam's maritime diplomacy in the North Natuna Seas is scarce. A discourse that is relevant to this article but does not directly relate is the maritime diplomatic dynamics of Indonesia and China in the North Natuna Seas. Even though encroachments have been majorly conducted by Vietnamese fishing boats, China's claims in the North Natuna Seas have become more of a dominant discourse among academia. In understanding China's use of coast guards and fishing vessels to trespass Indonesian waters illegally, (Ma'rif, Legionosuko, and Risman 2020) focused their analysis on Indonesia's calmness in facing a belligerent actor such as China in the North Natuna Seas. Geopolitical analysis of the events has been introduced by (Tampi 2018; Sulistyani, Citra Pertiwi, and Sari 2021), to comprehend further China's unique stance in the North Natuna Seas. But the article that is most relevant in this discourse to the article written is a writing by (Rosana, Dewi, and Agustin 2021), which focuses on China's IUUF strategy in the North Natuna Seas and possible resolutions to the tensions.

In conclusion, the study of maritime diplomacy, especially in understanding the maritime diplomatic events in the North Natuna Seas, is understudied. This article will attempt to address the research gap of this by implementing Le Mière's five-point framework in translating the maritime diplomatic events in the North Natuna Seas between Indonesia and Vietnam. Doing this will provide greater clarity as to the trajectory of policies that will take place between the two countries in the North Natuna Seas, in addition to the political dynamics that have unfolded between Indonesia and China in those waters.

### Methodology

In analyzing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas, this article focuses on five study cases of Vietnam fishing encroachment between 2020-2021. The study cases involve the Indonesian Navy, KKP (Indonesia Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels), and BAKAMLA and how they have responded to Vietnamese-related IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

This article focuses on Indonesia's response to Vietnam IUUF in the North Natuna Seas, therefore will provide emphasis on Indonesia's response to the actions. Out of the hundreds of Vietnamese intrusions in 2010 and 2021, this article focuses on the cases on the cases caught by the Indonesian maritime security forces only (KKP, BAKAMLA, Indonesian Police, or Indonesian Navy). Furthermore, the five study cases selected represent study cases with similar patterns of actions, which includes; (1) use of destructive fishing practices and overfishing, (2) lack of communication between Vietnam fishing vessels and Indonesian maritime security forces, (3) accompanied by VFRS guarding the fishing vessel, (4) responded by either KKP, BAKAMLA, Indonesian police, or Indonesian Navy. Five study cases were chosen as the response by KKP, BAKAMLA, Indonesian Police, or Indonesian Navy has been the same in 2020 and 2021, therefore can represent the hundreds of cases of Vietnamese IUUF in the North Natuna

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 3:

"In Literature Review, page 5 line 38... not concise and coherent academic debate on this topic. In short, LR is quite poor to explore the case"

Revisions:

The literature review comprises of two sections. The author commented to the first section of the LR, which is supposed to only provide a general overview on the growing literature of maritime diplomacy. The section that highlights the maritime trends between Indonesia and Vietnam is located in the second section, as the author attempts to display the growing consensus among academia of the Vietnam-Indonesian maritime relations that at times can be perilous.

Paul Chambers

Why is this paragraph way down on page 11? It should be in the introduction.

Paul Chambers

Again, please fix the English. Here you used the word "cases" twice.

Paul Chambers

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Paul Chambers

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Paul Chambers

Please spell out these acronyms

Seas. Furthermore, the study cases would provide an overview of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies in facing Vietnamese illegal IUUF.]

It is also pivotal to outline from the outset that the study case chosen is between 2020-2021, which is during Jokowi's second presidential term. This is due to the fact that academics have well interpreted the Indonesian diplomatic strategy in face of Vietnamese IUUF is through coercive means, considering Jokowi's past decisions to not compromise IUUF and conduct publicly-displayed bombardments of the illegally-trespassing vessels (Susilowati, Sulistiyono, and Rochwulaningsih 2018; Putra 2020). The years 2020 and 2021 thus is a period of time in which Jokowi has slowly retreated from his coercive-based maritime diplomacy strategy, and implemented a more peaceful, yet decisive approach to the IUUF issue in the North Natuna Seas.]

In analyzing Indonesia's responses, this article adopts Le Mière's five-points of framework (Le Mière, 2014) in assessing maritime diplomatic events, which consists of the following maritime diplomatic properties;

1. Kinetic Effect: By assessing whether a maritime diplomatic event is kinetic or non-kinetic, it will signal to adversaries the significance of the objective at stake. A tendency of using military forces, and coercive actions such as aggressive maneuvers, targeted violence, and warning shots across the bow, indicates a significant kinetic effect.
2. Symmetry or Asymmetry: Maritime diplomatic events categorized as asymmetrical entail that a more potent power is enforcing its abilities to establish changes to a certain policy (the balance of power is unequal among the aggressors). Meanwhile, symmetrical indicates equality in the balance of power.
3. Message is explicit, implicit, or unspoken messages: In the conduct of maritime diplomatic events, a protagonist will clarify its intent through the messages sent as an attempt to make clear a protagonist's main intentions. Explicitness in messages allows, for example, a minimum room for miscommunication, indicating a resolve based on the preferences of the announcer. Implicit messages can be dangerous, as it opens room for miscalculation and misinterpretation of messages. Meanwhile, unspoken messages are viewed more as a strategic move for a protagonist to keep all available options open for negotiations in the future.
4. Pre-emptive or reactive: A pre-emptive maritime diplomatic event has been planned in advance with certain goals that are targeted. Meanwhile, reactive maritime diplomatic events usually are impromptu without proper long-term planning.
5. Sustained or abbreviated: This maritime diplomatic property assesses the question of how long certain maritime events have been conducted throughout time.

This article perceives that Le Mière's five-points of framework provides a strong analysis as to the trajectory of future maritime policies. The Indo-Pacific region is currently a place of geostrategic and geopolitical shifts, with rising tensions among regional hegemony. The growing tensions in the past decade have led to misperception and miscalculation of state policies among littoral and non-littoral states, therefore it is pivotal to have a vivid analysis as to state actions in the region. By adopting Le Mière's five-points of framework, policymakers are provided enlightenment as to several key domains to maritime policies conducted by actors, including the true intentions of initially perceived coercive maneuvers in order to advance a state's adaptational ability towards maritime policies alike in the future. Furthermore, this mechanism assists states in steering clear of

Bama Andika Putra, S.J.P, MIR

Reviewer 2, comment 2:

"Second, there have been several hundred cases of vessels trespassing Indonesian waters, but the study only focuses on five incidents that occurred between 2020 and 2021 (p. 2, line 46). Why only five? Based on what criteria were they selected?"

Revisions:

I have added a paragraph justifying the study cases

Bama Andika Putra, S.J.P, MIR

Reviewer 2, comment 3:

"Third, the paper talks about trends in maritime diplomacy, but the authors only analyse five recent cases. How about the other few hundred cases during Jokowi's first presidential term?"

Revisions:

I have added a paragraph justifying the time period of 2020-2021.

Paul Chambers

Yes, we already know that you are using Le Mière's framework. Why do you have to say you are adopting it again? This is overly repetitive. You explained it already.

possible miscalculations and misperception of state maneuvers at sea, which is a critical element to hinder from escalation of conflicts.

In assessing the maritime diplomatic properties of the five study cases, a radar chart is displayed to illustrate the extent of each maritime characteristic further. This qualitative study utilizes primary and secondary data related to Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies in responding to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas in 2020-2021. The illustrations in the radar charts are made based on the following explanation:

1. Kinetic Effects: Points are given based on the extent of active forces and military equipments used in the event, and that the initial interpreted intentions are hostile,
2. Symmetry: Points are given if the level of power among the conflicting states are similar based on one's influence in global affairs,
3. Explicitness: Points are given based on the presence of clear communications during the event, highlighting the intentions of the actions,
4. Pre-emption or Reactive: Points are given if the event is pre-emptive, meaning that the conduct is planned and not a form of an impromptu response,
5. Sustainment: Points are given based on a policy's level of continuation.

#### Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

In Jokowi's first presidential term, he did not make any compromises to cases of IUUF in any parts of the Indonesian maritime borders. Through the then Minister of Fisheries of Maritime Affairs, Susi Pudjiastu, Indonesia successfully securitized any actions of IUUF through public bombings of the captured illegal fishing vessels (B A Putra 2020). Following Jokowi's second presidential term, Indonesia took a different approach in responding to cases of sea-based encroachments. Jokowi has been soft by capturing and seizing illegal fishing boats but not undergoing the same policy of public bombings as a deterrent effect. This article employs Le Mière's five-points of framework in assessing Indonesia's contemporary maritime diplomatic events concerning Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. In assessing this, the article will focus on the following study cases:

1. BAKAMLA chase down of Vietnam fishing boats, July 2020,
2. Indonesian Navy apprehension of two Vietnam fishing boats, October 2020
3. Vietnam vessel bearing the Indonesian flag captured by BAKAMLA, December 2020,
4. Five Vietnam fishing boats seized by KKP, April 2021
5. KKP, April 2021 captured two Vietnam fishing boats

The study cases above will then be analyzed, based on the criteria of kinetic effect, the explicitness of the messages sent, sustained or abbreviated, reactive or pre-emptive, and the power balance among the actors (symmetrical or asymmetrical).

The majority of fishing vessel encroachments into Indonesian waters originate from Vietnam. Because of the many cases of illegal trespassing into the North Natuna Seas, Vietnam, through its fishing boats, is trying to normalize its claims over their version of the EEZ, which collides with Indonesia's claim over the North Natuna Seas. Indonesia's stakeholders that have been active in the process of seizing, capturing, and escorting these fishing vessels out of Indonesian waters are the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP. As Indonesia is slowly moving forward from a coercive-based maritime diplomatic reaction of publicly bombarding illegal fishing vessels that trespass Indonesian waters, a

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 2:

"Author (s) do use 1) kinetic effect, 2) explicitness of messages, 3) balance of power among the countries, 4) policy is reactive or pre-emptive, and 5) sustainment of policy. Why do authors prefer to use this model than other?"

Revisions:

I have added a paragraph that justifies the use of Le Mière's 5-points of framework in assessing maritime diplomatic events

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 4:

"Findings: Illustrating study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Sea missed data presented in table or statistics. How did data analyzed in the Figure 1. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas."

Revisions:

1. I have added an additional paragraph in the methodology section that provides clarification as to how the radar charts are made. Furthermore, the radar chart is interpreted based on Le Mière's five-point framework, which provides higher points for the following characteristics (kinetic effect, symmetry in global affairs, explicitness of intentions, pre-emptive or reactive policy), and sustainment of the policy.
2. In constructing the radar chart, it does not require a dataset, as it is purely based on the interpretation of the author after analyzing the series of events that transpired in a maritime diplomatic event.

Paul Chambers

Why these five cases?

Paul Chambers

Again, spell out acronyms

Paul Chambers

Again spell out acronyms

Paul Chambers

Why space?

further assessment is needed in investigating contemporary maritime diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas.

Most of the study cases presented in this article consist of the illegal trespassing of Vietnamese fishing vessels in the North Natuna Seas. In July 2020, BAKAMLA chased down a Vietnamese fishing boat that maneuvered around the North Natuna Seas (Eadli 2020b). Sailors of the boat endeavored to avoid arrest by speeding away during the chase down with BAKAMLA and discarded their fishing nets. They were desperate as they continued to conduct zig-zag maneuvers that were dangerous for other vessels in the area, as well as burned tires to minimize vision. BAKAMLA's patrol boat, the KN Pulau Dana-323, initially communicated with the fishing vessel but attained no response. Furthermore, they maneuvered around the fishing vessel and alerted them through semaphore signals but did not attain any response. As a last resort, BAKAMLA decided to take warning shots into the air, then on the fishing boat platform as a final warning. The fishing crew then were arrested along with 2 tons of illegally caught fish (Eadli 2020b).

The second study case involved the Indonesian Navy and their apprehension of 2 Vietnam fishing boats that sailed along the North Natuna Seas in October 2020. The 2 Vietnam fishing boats conducted illegal fishing into Indonesia's continental shelf, igniting the Indonesian Navy's response. Indonesia's KRI John Lie-358 managed to undergo a one-hour chase down with Vietnam's fishing vessels BV0908TS and BV499TS, as the fishing boats trespassed into Indonesian waters (TNI-AL 2020). The event took place at midnight, and Vietnam's fishing vessels turned off their lights and released their fishing nets. The Indonesian Navy continuously gave warnings to stop, fired warning shots, and was then able to conduct a visit board search and seizure. In an official statement by the Indonesian Navy, it was stated that Indonesia's responses here are part of the Operation *Koarmada I* Marine Combat Group, which embraced the commitment to protecting Indonesian waters despite facing hardships in operations during pandemic times (TNI-AL 2020).

BAKAMLA was again involved in the third study case against a Vietnamese fishing vessel bearing the Indonesian flag in December 2020. As an attempt to trick Indonesian authorities, BAKAMLA encountered a fishing vessel in December 2020 that maneuvered illegally in Indonesia's North Natuna Seas. The Vietnam vessel BT 95212 had at their disposal 2 tons of fish and dried shark fins with no proper fishing documents at hand (Eadli 2020a). As an attempt to not get captured, BAKAMLA stated that they attempted to display the Indonesian flag to avoid possible raids by the Indonesian authorities.

The last two study cases involved Indonesia's KKP, specifically, vessels under the Directorate General of Marine and Fishery Resources Supervision. The first study case took place in April 2021, with Indonesia's KKP capturing five illegal Vietnam fishing boats at the same time (Aprian 2021). Vietnam's fishing boats had squid as their primary commodity target and decided to flee when approached by Indonesian officials. Secretary-General of the Ministry of Maritime and Affairs and Fisheries, Anton Novamba, stated that capturing the five illegally trespassing fishing boats is a form of commitment by the Indonesian government not to compromise any forms of illegal activity fishing in Indonesian waters (Aprian 2021). Furthermore, due to the recent capturing that took place, Indonesia is strengthening its surveillance capabilities in the North Natuna Seas, Malacca Strait, and North Sulawesi Sea.

The last study case took place in April 2021, with KKP arresting 2 Vietnam vessels poaching in the North Natuna Seas. The patrol ship of Orca 03 managed to detain the fishing boats of KG 9307 TS and KNF 7727 after they were caught tugging their pair trawl to catch fish (Rahman and Haryati 2021). After the event, Indonesia's KKP continued to emphasize the importance of not conducting illegal fishing in Indonesian waters and that the KKP will continue to be active in making sure illegal poaching continues to be responded not lightly.




Figure 3: Location of the Vietnamese vessels in April 2021  
Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)

#### Assessing the maritime diplomatic characteristics of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

As illustrated in the previous section, Indonesia has responded to cases of Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas through its Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP (depending on the site of which the vessels are captured). Indonesia's contemporary maritime diplomatic strategies have shifted and are no longer oriented to the traditional coercive public displaying of destroying illegal shipping boats. If assessed based on Le Miere's five-points of framework, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas consists of a considerably significant kinetic effect, sustainment of policy throughout time (consistent responses), explicitness in the message accompanying the maritime diplomatic action, reactive in nature, as well as the absence of power balance between Vietnam and Indonesia, which allows Indonesia to compel its will in the emerging study cases. An illustration of the extent of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic properties across the five study cases can be seen in figure 4.

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 1, comment 1:  
"author(s) did not display map figuring where border overlapping claims in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Indonesia and Vietnam is"

Revisions:  
I have added a map to better display the locations of Vietnamese IUUF in Indonesian waters (2021)

Bama Andika Putra

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


Figure 4. Maritime diplomatic characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

In the point of kinetic effect, the study cases tend to indicate an average to a significant level of kinetic effect in Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies in the North Natuna Seas against Vietnam's IUUF. As stated in past sections of this article, a significant kinetic effect will signal to adversaries how important is the objective at stake. Indonesia, through its Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP, shows that Indonesia is willing to go to an extensive extent to protect its sovereignty at sea. Study cases that involved BAKAMLA and the Indonesian Navy represent the tough stance of Indonesia through the use of strategies aimed to compel adversaries to alter their actions. Warning shots to the air and in the ship platforms have been used in the study cases and aggressive maneuvers to stop the actions of IUUF that took place in the study cases. The intentionality of striking the target solidifies Indonesia's intentions of protecting its sovereignty and shows the importance of protecting the North Natuna Seas for Indonesia.

However, the last two study cases indicated a decline of kinetic effect conducted by Indonesian officials. Through the Indonesian KKP, aspects of kinetic effect were not absent but majorly suppressed compared to previous study cases mentioned. Previous study cases consisted of active use of military forces with the conduct of coercive actions, including blockage, prevention of an adversary's movement, and warning shots. Meanwhile, study cases involving the KKP lacked this similar form, as their main concern here is the action of blocking, capturing, and seizing ships that have illegally trespassed Indonesian waters. Actions by the KKP thus still contain kinetic effects to a certain extent, but not as significant as the study cases involving the Indonesian Navy and BAKAMLA. In conclusion, the dominant kinetic effect in Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies in the North Natuna Seas indicates Indonesia's intent to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas by upholding international law and its desire to avoid futile conflicts with the opposing stakeholder.

All of the study cases reflect Indonesia's explicitness in sending the message of Indonesia's claims in the North Natuna Seas. Officials directly state the messages during the crisis and post-event, in which the actions of Indonesia, aims, resolve, and the

Bama Andika Putra  
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Paul Chambers  
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Paul Chambers  
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consequences of violating its territory were clearly transmitted to Vietnam vessels. Based on this category, the medium, which is the utilization of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP fishing vessels that operate throughout Indonesia's EEZ and continental shelf, is a clear indication of Indonesia's intent to normalize its North Natuna Sea claims. So in the factors of the medium, the active presence of Indonesian officials is the message itself. Regarding the substantive message, in all of the study cases listed, Indonesian officials have been straightforward in explaining how Vietnam vessels have illegally trespassed Indonesian waters, the North Natuna Seas. So despite inconclusive meetings between Indonesia and Vietnam in figuring out how to resolve the issue of EEZ and continental shelf boundaries among the two countries, Indonesia consistently implements a policy that normalizes its claims in the overall waters of the North Natuna Seas.

The study cases' explicitness of Indonesia's message shows that the message itself cannot be misconstrued or misinterpreted in any form possible. It thus makes it difficult for other stakeholders to implement a stance against it and further puts Indonesia at an advantage as Indonesia avoids unnecessary escalation of conflicts to take place. The trajectory of Indonesia's stance construed by its message also signifies how it will be difficult for Indonesia to be flexible in future negotiations related to the North Natuna Seas, as the stance has been clearly stated. Indonesia is confident with its claims in the North Natuna Seas, and the explicitness displayed indicates possible future resolve under the preference of Indonesia. Despite the varying intensity, all five study cases indicate a strong element of explicitness in the messages sent. The intensity of explicitness in study cases involving KKP is considered less compared to those related to the Indonesian Navy and BAKAMLA, as KKP strictly disseminates the message of fishing-related activities only, not the overall security of the North Natuna Seas, such as the rhetoric used by the Indonesian Navy and BAKAMLA.

Assessing the power balance among the countries involved in the IUUF can determine the future possibilities on stability and motivations of the countries. To achieve peace, it is ideal for the countries' intention to be of the same power, meaning the power balance factor is present. Vietnam and Indonesia's power balance is asymmetrical, meaning the power balance is not equal. This puts Indonesia at an advantage, as when negotiations are conducted, they can exert their interests to be implemented in agreements. Indonesia in Southeast Asia is superior to Vietnam, reflected by its GDP, military size, population, and ability to introduce international norms to regional organizations such as ASEAN. Indonesia has been, to a limited extent, coercive in facing illegal Vietnamese fishing ships in the North Natuna Seas. They have not been hesitant in showing that the waters belong to Indonesia, and the perpetrators of the violations of international law will be trialed in accordance.

In all study cases involving Vietnam fishing vessels, it is clearly seen that the consequence of an unequal power balance shows great consequences. As explained by Le Miere in his writings, the presence of an asymmetrical power balance will result in a stronger power to enforce its policy references to the weaker country, and this is feasible due to their relatively higher power in comparison to the other. As Indonesia is the stronger power perpetrating the conduct of protecting its sovereign waters through a limited coercive pathway, it reflects Indonesia's willingness to fully claim the North Natuna Seas and not be flexible with future negotiations with Vietnam. Despite much optimism that Indonesia and Vietnam will compromise the issue of the EEZ and

continental shelf that collides in the North Natuna Seas, this article believes that the asymmetrical power difference will make Indonesia enforce their preference of no tolerations in the delimitation of their sovereign waters.

In all study cases presented, clear indications of the policy being sustained throughout time are well present. The utilization of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP regularly operating in the EEZ of Indonesia is a common policy for Indonesia. What occurred in recent times is the decrease of coerciveness in cases of IUUF. In Jokowi's first presidential term, the focus was on establishing a deterrent effect through the bombings of illegal fishing vessels through public display. That is no longer a policy conducted by Indonesia due to the public backlash it attained from neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. But the decrease of coerciveness does not indicate that the policy implemented now, which consists of strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, and warning shots, constitutes as a newly introduced policy. The contemporary actions by Indonesian officials can still be considered as sustainable, as it is an extension of past similar policies in an attempt to decrease IUUF in Indonesian sovereign waters. Therefore, despite differing with past coercive levels conducted as an Indonesian maritime diplomatic strategy, the strategy itself is sustained, thus a clear attestation to Indonesia's commitment to its North Natuna Sea policy.

The last maritime diplomatic property that is assessed is whether the study cases fall under the category of pre-emptive or reactive. Maritime diplomatic events that fall under the category of pre-emptive maritime diplomacy reflect that certain policies have been planned long in advance to achieve a certain goal. As the policy is sustained and pre-emptively prepared, the protagonist (in this case, Indonesia) is confident about its possible outcome due to its unmoved stance. Maritime diplomatic events characterized as reactive means that it is conducted based on an impromptu nature. Events under this category are subjected to possibilities of uncertainties, as reactive maritime diplomacy does not give sufficient time to prepare and plan actions in advance, leading to a lack of ability to map possible scenarios to a certain outcome of an event. Le Mièrè stated that reactive maritime diplomacy opens bigger possibilities of events evolving to become more dangerous and escalatory.

It is with no doubt that the study cases on Indonesia's maritime diplomatic policies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas are reactive. Indonesia continued its policies of strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, and warning shots against Vietnam's IUUF, which are conducted as a form of response towards the trespassing of fishing ships in Indonesian waters. Indonesia's reactive maritime diplomacy established greater uncertainties as to the orientation of the situations in the study cases. That is why in several study cases, Indonesian officials encountered fishing boats that attempted to fool Indonesian officials by bearing the Indonesian flag, turning off their lights at midnight, and to the use of aggressive maneuvers. Le Mièrè stated that reactive policies tend to be more dangerous due to the uncertainties and possibility of escalation that may occur. To a certain extent, the crisis in the North Natuna Seas increased as most of the responses by the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP had to be impromptu and based on instinct. However, there is a line that Indonesian officials have not exceeded, despite their actions being reactive maritime diplomacy. That line is not to exceed their traditional forms of coerciveness in handling illegal ship poaching in the North Natuna Seas.

### Policy Implications

In the midst of the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific, state actors have become wary of coercive maneuvers at sea. Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas contains a number of pivotal policy implications for regional security in the region. It is worthy to note that unlike China's sustained maneuvers in the South China Sea, or the US Freedom of Navigation in the Pacific Oceans, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy in facing Vietnamese IUUF is categorized as reactive. Therefore, the conduct of strict patrols by BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, and the Indonesian Navy, aggressive maneuvers, and warning shots against Vietnam's IUUF vessels, is a form of response towards trespassing of fishing ships in Indonesian waters. It is thus a possibility that in certain intrusion cases in the future, Indonesia will showcase greater coerciveness in protecting its sea territory. However, Indonesia has never acted to the point that it violates existing international laws and regulations.

This uncertainty is also contributed by the lack of power balance between Vietnam and Indonesia. Indonesia displayed a more straightforward and coercive response to the IUUF vessels from Vietnam, but has basically become more reluctant to respond the same with fishing vessels from China. Indonesian forces are not reluctant in the conduct of their maritime diplomatic strategies considering that they are in a position to exert their interests against Vietnam. Therefore, if Vietnam and Indonesia fail to conclude the UNCLOS provisional agreement on their overlapping EEZ claims, it would not become a surprise that Indonesia will continue compelling Vietnam away from Indonesia's EEZ.

Nevertheless, in the domains of kinetic effect, sustainment, and explicitness, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy against Vietnam IUUF is considered consistent. They have always been explicit in their message that they coerce foreign ships as they violate Indonesia's EEZ, have used military means to compel adversaries to alter their actions, and conducted sustainable operations at sea through the Indonesian sea law enforcement including BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, and the Indonesian Navy. A strong point of recommendation for this though, is that all of the Indonesian bodies need to work in synergy to counter cases of IUUF, especially that originating from Vietnam.

### Conclusion

Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas has evolved with time. Jokowi has reoriented his policies to one that is more accommodative to its neighboring state's voices of decreasing Indonesia's level of coerciveness at sea. What was once a public display of the bombings of illegal ships, Indonesia has focused now on its maritime capacities to undergo its traditional role of strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, and warning shots against any illegal ship that trespasses Indonesian sovereign waters. The bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam have long been tarnished by the presence of the unresolved maritime borders in the North Natuna Seas. Despite having a long history of cooperation in multilateral forums such as ASEAN, the rising occurrence of IUUF in the North Natuna Seas perpetrated by Vietnamese flagged-fishing vessels continues to raise concern in Jakarta.

This article assesses the maritime diplomatic strategies of Jokowi against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. Five study cases were evaluated based on its maritime

Bama Andika Putra, S.IP, MIR

Reviewer 2, comment 4:

"Fourth, the paper doesn't discuss the implications of the results. That is, it is unclear what insight can be obtained through the case study analysis."

Revisions:

I have added a section focusing on the policy implications of the study cases.

diplomatic properties in order to understand Jokowi's contemporary maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas. The study cases involved raids, capturing, and seizures of illegal Vietnam fishing boats that infiltrated the North Natuna Seas between 2020-2021. Each study case was responded well by the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, or KKP. As a result, it is clearly shown that Indonesia is signaling its intent to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas but is willing to avoid needless conflicts at sea. Through Le Miere's five-points of framework, it is concluded that Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF; 1) heavily consists of kinetic effect, 2) sustainment of policy throughout time (consistent responses), 3) Indonesian message is explicitly stated accompanying the maritime diplomatic action, 4) reactive maritime diplomacy, rather than pre-emptive, and 5) lack of power balance between stakeholders.

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**Revisi Kedua (nama editor pada komentar adalah native proofreader yang membantu penyempurnaan artikel):**

**Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in the North Natuna Seas**

The bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam have long been tarnished by the unresolved maritime borders surrounding the North Natuna Seas. Despite having a long history of cooperation in multilateral forums such as the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], the increasing occurrence of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the North Natuna Seas continues to raise concern in Jakarta, due to being perpetrated by Vietnamese flagged vessels. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate the maritime diplomatic strategies of Jokowi against the encroachment of Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas. Although there had been hundreds of incidents, five analytical cases were evaluated based on their maritime diplomatic properties, to understand Jokowi's contemporary strategy within the sea boundaries. These involved (1) Indonesia's responses to illegal Vietnam fishing boats, which infiltrated the North Natuna Seas through the Navy between 2020-2021, (2) the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, and (3) Indonesian Police or Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery. According to Le Mière's five framework points, this country's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF exhibited the following: (1) heavily contained kinetic effect, (2) maintenance of policy through time (consistent responses), (3) message explicitness accompanying the diplomatic action, (4) reactive diplomacy than pre-emptive strategy, and (5) lack of power balance between stakeholders. The results also argued that this Indonesian strategy was obtained from mildly coerced and sustained efforts, to compel aggressors towards steering far from its sea boundaries, through raids, captures, and seizures of illegal fishing boats.

Keywords: maritime diplomacy; North Natuna Seas; IUUF; maritime borders

**Introduction**

The overlapping between Indonesia and Vietnam is continuously observed as an irritant to their bilateral relations in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This indicates the continuous occurrence of contestations in the North Natuna Seas, where the maritime borders related to both countries' EEZ are found to be incomplete. In this condition, Vietnam commenced a single boundary for its EEZ and continental shelf, with Indonesia being persistent in placing its possession as separate entities. Furthermore, the difficulty in completing these countries' maritime borders is not as complicated as other regional boundary tensions, leading to the signing of agreements allowing more extraordinary confidence-building measures in their bilateral relationships. This exhibits the agreement on a comprehensive partnership in 2003, which was continuously observed with the implementation of a strategic relationship in 2013<sup>5</sup>. Despite the tensions at sea, the commitment of these countries to the establishment of peace is still observed by the vast number of completed maritime-related agreements, leading to greater collaboration. Vietnam and Indonesia also met in twelve negotiation rounds from 2010 to 2021, towards addressing the growing concern on the EEZ delimitation, as well as the elevation of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) in the North Natuna Seas, a maritime area between both countries. Additionally, the conflicting legal positions between these countries are continuously observed as significant barriers to any definitive agreement, despite the expressed desires to resolve the growing issues.

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The incompleteness of the limitations within the maritime borders has reportedly led to an increased and staggering encroachment of Vietnamese fishing vessels into Indonesian waters. Between 2014-2019 (Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) first presidential term), this country had seized 488 illegal trespassing ships, with half of them being Vietnamese vessels<sup>6</sup>. By 2020-2021, the interceptions of Vietnamese ships became a common occurrence for the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), Police (POLRI), Navy, as well as the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels (KKP). Jokowi also implemented a tough stance based on the country's maritime-related affairs<sup>7</sup>. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. This leads to the specific consideration of five cases, which emphasized the illegal fishing boats trespassing the sea boundaries between 2020-2021. Despite the numerous Vietnamese intrusions in 2010 and 2021, emphasis is only conducted on the cases where the vessels were caught by the Indonesian maritime security forces (KKP, BAKAMLA, or Indonesian Navy). The five selected reviews also represented the cases with similar action patterns, including (1) the use of destructive fishing practices and overfishing, (2) lack of communication between Vietnam fishing vessels and Indonesian maritime security forces, (3) the VFRS guarding the fishing vessel, and (4) the response of the KKP, BAKAMLA, POLRI, or Indonesian Navy. This indicates that the selected cases are based on the response of the KKP, BAKAMLA, POLRI, or Indonesian Navy, which led to the depiction of the numerous occurrences of Vietnamese IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

In constructing the maritime diplomatic strategies and policies, the five-point framework of Christian Le Mièrre was utilized in the assessment of events. Based on the specific characterization of each selected case to the conception of Le Mièrre, the trends of Indonesian diplomacy are subsequently gauged in the North Natuna Seas. This specifically emphasizes the correlation between Vietnam's IUUF and the involvement of its coastguards in several instances. After assessing these diplomatic strategies, an argument is also expected based on the criteria of kinetic effect, sustainment, reactivity, explicitness, and balance of power, as Indonesia opted to mildly implement coerced and sustained efforts towards compelling aggressors from Indonesian waters. The lack of studies on previous diplomatic strategies also contributes to the better trajectory assessment of future maritime events, especially in the North Natuna Seas. Therefore, the initial knowledge of Indonesia's contemporary stance is very important during maritime affairs. In the 2014 inaugural speech, the Indonesian grand strategy was outlined by the president towards the establishment of the Global Maritime Axis (GMA), which positioned the country as a strategic hub between the Indian and Pacific Oceans<sup>8</sup>. This led to the implementation of the internal and external foreign policies utilizing the maritime potential. One of these internal highlights is the increase of connectivity among Indonesian islands, through the construction of a sea-based highway<sup>9</sup>. Meanwhile, neighboring countries were found not to violate the country's territorial sea borders, as a cornerstone of the external policy. The strictness of this country also included the policy of the former KKP minister, Susi Pudjiastuti, in the deliberate bombing and sinking of the illegal fishing ships captured in various operations<sup>10</sup>. In this public exhibition, most of the captured and sunk ships were found to originate from Malaysia, Vietnam, and China. Figure 1 illustrates the overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone between Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as the regions of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

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


Figure 1: Location of the overlapping EEZ between Indonesia and Vietnam (White and Green border lines), as well as the region of the growing Vietnamese IUUF in Indonesian waters (2021)  
 Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)<sup>13</sup>

The issue of IUUF is continuously conducted in these waters with every passing year, as China was found to continue its aggressive maneuvers in the North Natuna Seas. This involved the utilization of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and other non-military vessels, for the normalization of claims on these sea boundaries. During these previous years, the Vietnamese fishing vessels have also been a major contributor to encroachment on Indonesian waters. In 2021, the number of IUUF cases from these vessels reached an all-time high of 296 and 100 intrusions, according to the detections by the Citra Satellite and Automatic Identification System (Fig. 2). Despite this, Indonesia was only able to capture 38 illegally-trespassing Vietnam vessels, through BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, or the Navy (Table 1).




Figure 2: Illegal Vietnam fishing vessel intrusions detected in the North Natuna Seas in 2021 (AIS and Citra Satellite)  
 Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022)<sup>14</sup>

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Table 1: The number of Vietnamese fishing vessels captured by the Indonesian maritime security law enforcement agencies in 2021

Institution	Number of illegal fishing ships caught
Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery (KKP)	25
Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA)	3
Indonesian Police (POLRI)	8
Indonesian Navy	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>38</b>

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022) <sup>15</sup>

On these waters, a growing normalization pattern of Vietnam IUUF was observed, subsequently elevating a tremendous concern for policymakers in Indonesia. Despite this, some academics have not significantly invested in understanding the maritime dynamics in the North Natuna Seas. Meanwhile, others observed that these dynamics only included the minor tensions between Indonesia and China, due to the involvement of the CCG <sup>16</sup>. Irrespective of the results obtained, less analysis was still performed to decipher the various maritime diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas, which should not be lightly considered. In previous years, the number of IUUF had considerably increased in the North Natuna and Sulawesi Seas, as well as the Strait of Malacca <sup>15</sup>. This indicated that the concerns of Jakarta were steadily growing with time, as Indonesia observed the IUUF occurrences as a sign to subsequently invest in patrols and secure its sovereignty at sea. In 2017, Jokowi announced the name of the waters as the 'North Natuna Seas', to display a tougher stance on the issue of the South China Sea and the growing IUUF of the aggressors' fishing vessels. To solidify the rights of this country in the adjacent EEZ, the policy of Jokowi was not baseless regarding the occurrence of concerning maneuvers in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, Indonesian states have not been hesitant to show their belligerence in the South China Seas, due to gradually following the Chinese strategies in expanding their sea boundaries, through the creation of artificial lands. They also accompanied the Chinese fishing vessels through the CCG (Chinese Coastguards) <sup>19</sup>. This indicated that the act of IUUF was a case of pre-emptive maritime policy, which is carefully constructed to normalize a specific regional claim. In all the selected study cases, the apprehended Vietnamese fishing vessels were accompanied by the VFRS (Vietnam Fisheries Resource Surveillance), indicating a suspicious trend for Indonesian policymakers. Therefore, the analysis of the ongoing Vietnam IUUF cases in the North Natuna Seas is very important, based on the investigation of the maritime diplomatic characteristics embedded in each case.

#### Literature Review

To exhibit the deficiencies in this study, the review outline contained two major topics, namely (1) maritime diplomacy and (2) the analysis of Indonesia and Vietnam maritime-related tensions. This proved that the initially related discourse focused on maritime diplomacy and the development of this report throughout the years. In this condition, the influence of sea power was initially introduced by a U.S. naval officer and historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose main arguments in 'The Influence of Historical Sea Power (1660-1783)' positioned the country with immense pleasure in protecting its vital water interest <sup>21</sup>. Based on the increase of competition at sea over time, security and

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dominance were very critical for great powers, to achieve specific national interests<sup>25</sup>. Besides these results, numerous critical reports were also continuously produced by Mahan on maritime diplomacy. Despite not directly referencing the terminology of this policy, the early works of this expert provided the argument on the developmental patterns of the sea's immense potential. They also provided the sea utilization patterns of the state actors, to achieve national interests<sup>24</sup>.

Based on the studies of Mahan, 'Gunboat Diplomacy' was introduced by James Cable. This explained that specific national agendas were achieved through coercive diplomacy, which involved the utilization of navies in this present study<sup>25</sup>. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, some previous reviews analyzed the impact of navies and other sea-based hard power assets to achieve national interests. Most of these reports specifically referenced the study cases from several locations<sup>26, 30</sup>, with Le Mière (2014) mostly emphasized. This introduced the terminology of 'maritime diplomacy' with the threefold typology continuously used by study experts, namely coercive, persuasive, and cooperative policies<sup>31</sup>. It also explained that this typology aimed to capture the diversified forms of diplomatic events, which did not only contain coercive-based actions according to the stipulations of other previous GD (Gunboat Diplomacy) studies. However, the five-point framework was the ultimate contribution of Le Mière (2014), based on the assessment of maritime diplomatic events. This focused on the kinetic effect, message explicitness, event sustainability or abbreviation, reactive or pre-emptive conditions, as well as symmetrical or asymmetrical power balance among conflicting actors<sup>32</sup>. The kinetic effect is the utilization level of active forces and coercive maneuvers in conducting a maritime diplomatic event. Meanwhile, the message explicitness depends on the assessment or non-assessment patterns of the aggressor on the intentions of the diplomatic event. The sustainability of events also focuses on the performance length of a specific operation. It is also part of a more extensive operation sustained through a certain period. When conducted diplomatic actions are only in response or not spontaneous to specific encounters, they are considered reactive and pre-emptive events, respectively. Subsequently, maritime diplomatic events are often characterized as symmetrical or asymmetrical actions, depending on the power balance of the conflict actors in the conflict. When considerable differences and similarities are observed in the actors' power balance, these events are considered to be asymmetrical and symmetrical, respectively.

Based on this review, the second discourse focused on Indonesia and Vietnam's maritime-related tensions. This excluded any arguments on the bilateral relations of these countries and specifically emphasized the tensions in the North Natuna Seas. Some previous studies are found to have majorly focused on the IUUF issues in these waters. Amidst the elevation of tensions, numerous possible solutions have reportedly been assessed, such as the arrangement of a joint agreement on fishing events<sup>36, 37</sup>. Furthermore, the study of Arsyad was optimistic about the solution to this issue through effective mutual understanding between Vietnam and Indonesia<sup>38</sup>. Special attention was also provided to the label of the waters as the North Natuna Seas, with several neighboring countries such as Vietnam, found to be clearly against it<sup>40</sup>. Despite this assessment, the most relevant results were still observed in Sasmita (2021), where a solid analysis of Indonesian maritime diplomacy (MD) was provided due to the threefold typology of Le Mière, including coercive, persuasive, and cooperative MD. This stated that the coercive, cooperative, and persuasive maritime diplomacy against the trespassers was based on vessel sinking, bilateral collaborative formation, and naval presence, respectively<sup>42</sup>. Despite citing Le Mière (2014), the study still characterized the numerous cases of diplomatic events conducted between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas.

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Based on observation, the literature related to Indonesia and Vietnam's maritime diplomacy in the North Natuna Seas is scarce. However, a relevant and indirect discourse was observed on the dynamics of Indonesia and China within these sea boundaries. Although encroachments were majorly conducted by Vietnamese fishing boats, China's claims in the North Natuna Seas were still a dominant academic discourse. In understanding the use of CCG and fishing vessels to illegally trespass these waters, the study of Ma'ruf, Legionosuko, and Risman analytically focused on Indonesia's calmness in confronting belligerent actors, such as China<sup>45</sup>. A geopolitical analysis of these events was also introduced by Tampi, to subsequently comprehend China's unique stance in the North Natuna Seas<sup>46</sup>. Despite these results, the study of Rosana, Dewi, and Agustin was found to be highly relevant to the discourse, due to focusing on possible tension resolutions and China's IUUF strategy on the waters<sup>46</sup>. This indicated that maritime diplomacy was understudied, especially in understanding the North Natuna Seas' events. Therefore, this present article aims to address these gaps through Le Mière's five-point framework, to interpret the diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas. This is expected to provide greater clarity to the trajectory of policies occurring between these countries. It is also expected to serve as an addition to the political dynamics unfolded between Indonesia and China in these waters.

### Methodology

In this analysis, five cases of Vietnam fishing encroachment were emphasized between 2020-2021. These involved the Indonesian Navy, KKP (Indonesia Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels), and BAKAMLA, as well as their response patterns to the IUUF issues on the sea boundaries. They were also selected between 2020-2021, during Jokowi's second presidential term. This was because some reports had accurately interpreted the Indonesian diplomatic strategy through coercive media, considering Jokowi's previous decisions not to compromise IUUF and conduct public bombardments of the illegal vessels<sup>47</sup>. In 2020-2021, Jokowi gradually retreated from the coercive-based strategy, as well as implemented a more peaceful and decisive approach to the IUUF issue in the North Natuna Seas. With Le Mière's five-point framework, the following maritime diplomatic properties were assessed.

1. Kinetic Effect: By assessing the kinetic and non-kinetic levels of a maritime diplomatic event, the significance of the objective is often signaled to the adversaries. This indicates that the use of military forces and coercive actions is a significant kinetic effect, such as aggressive maneuvers, targeted violence, and warning shots across the bow.
2. Symmetry or Asymmetry Power Balance: Asymmetrical events often show that more potent powers enforce their abilities towards the establishment of changes to a specific policy, i.e., balance is unequal among the aggressors. Meanwhile, symmetrical indicates equality in the balance of power.
3. Explicit, Implicit, or Unspoken Messages: In maritime diplomatic events, the intention of a protagonist is often clarified through the provided messages. This explains that explicitness ensures a minimum space for miscommunication, indicating a resolution based on the preferences of the announcer. Implicit messages are found to be commonly dangerous, due to the adoption of miscalculation and misinterpretation. Meanwhile, unspoken messages are highly observed as a strategic medium, to ensure the availability of all options for future negotiations.

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4. Pre-emptive or **Reactive Events**: A pre-emptive diplomatic event is often planned with specific targeted goals, while reactive occurrences are commonly impromptu without proper long-term organization.
  5. Sustained or **Abbreviated Events**: This assesses the length by which specific maritime events have been conducted over time.
- This article perceives that Le Mière's five-point framework provides a strong analysis based on the trajectory of future maritime policies. This was because the Indo-Pacific region is presently an area containing geostrategic and geopolitical shifts, with rising tensions among regional hegemony. In previous decades, these tensions led to the misperception and miscalculation of policies among littoral and non-littoral states, leading to the necessity to possess a vivid analysis of regional actions. Using the five-point framework, policymakers were enlightened on several core domains, including the true intentions of initially perceived coercive maneuvers, to advance a state's adaptation ability towards future maritime policies. This assisted states in steering away from possible miscalculations and misperception of sea maneuvers, which is a critical element hindering the escalation of conflicts. In assessing the diplomatic properties of the selected cases, a radar chart was displayed to illustrate the extent of each subsequent characteristic. This qualitative study used the primary and secondary data related to Indonesia's MD strategies, in responding to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas within 2020-2021. Additionally, the illustrations in the radar charts were exhibited based on the following.
1. Kinetic Effects: Points were provided based on the extent of active forces and utilized military equipment, with the initial interpreted intentions being observed as hostile.
  2. Symmetry: Points were provided when the level of power was similar among the conflicting states, based on one's influence in global affairs.
  3. Explicitness: Points were provided based on the presence of clear communications during the event, subsequently highlighting the intentions of the actions.
  4. Pre-emption or Reactive: Points were provided when the event was planned and not an impromptu response.
  5. Sustainment: Points were provided based on a policy's continuous level.

**Illustrating the study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas**

In the initial presidential term of Jokowi, no compromises were carried out to cases of IUUF in any parts of the maritime borders. Based on the Minister of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Susi Pudjiasuti, Indonesia successfully securitized any IUUF actions through public bombings of the captured illegal fishing vessels<sup>48</sup>. During the Jokowi's second presidential term, the country then adopted a different approach to responding to sea-based encroachments. This was based on the capture and seizure of illegal fishing boats, which did not require a similar policy of public bombings. Special inference was also provided to the following study cases, to represent the various intrusion cases made by Vietnam IUUF.

1. The Indonesian Maritime Security Agency chase down Vietnam fishing boats (July 2020).
2. Indonesian Navy apprehension of two Vietnam fishing boats (October 2020).
3. Vietnam vessel bearing the Indonesian flag captured by the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (December 2020).
4. Five Vietnam fishing boats were seized by the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (April 2021).

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5. The Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries captured two Vietnam fishing boats (April 2021).

This proved that the majority of fishing vessel encroachments into Indonesian waters originated from Vietnam. Due to many illegal trespasses on the North Natuna Seas, the oppressor (Vietnam) is attempting to normalize its claims over their EEZ version, which collides with that of Indonesia over the North Natuna Seas. The active stakeholders responsible for the processes of seizing, capturing, and escorting these fishing vessels away from the waters were the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP. With gradual adjustment from a coercive-based diplomatic reaction, a subsequent assessment was needed in investigating the contemporary MD events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas. Most of the study cases presented in this article contained the illegal trespassing of Vietnamese fishing vessels on these sea boundaries, where BAKAMLA chased down a maneuvering boat in July 2020<sup>52</sup>. In this condition, the sailors endeavored to avoid arrest by speeding away and discarding their fishing nets. Their desperation to escape led to the burning of tires to minimize vision and continuous performance of zig-zag maneuvers, which were dangerous for other vessels in the area. Furthermore, the BAKAMLA's patrol boat (KN Pulau Dana-323) initially communicated with the fishing vessel without obtaining a response. This led to the maneuver around the vessel with a subsequent alert through semaphore signals. With no response obtained, BAKAMLA decided to take warning shots into the air and the fishing boat, subsequently arresting the crew with 2 tons of illegally caught fish<sup>51</sup>.

The second study case involved the Indonesian Navy and their apprehension of 2 Vietnam fishing boats, which sailed along the North Natuna Seas in October 2020. These boats conducted illegal fishing on Indonesia's continental shelf and ignited the immediate response of the Navy. In this condition, the country's KRI John Lie-358 underwent a one-hour chase down with the trespassing vessels, BV0908TS and BV499TS (TNI-AL 2020). This occurred at midnight, as the trespassing vessels turned off their lights and released their fishing nets. The Indonesian Navy continuously provided stoppage alerts and fired warning shots, before conducting a visit board search and seizure. In an official statement, the Navy stated that the responses were part of the Operation Koarmada I Marine Combat Group, which embraced the commitment to protecting Indonesian waters despite encountering operational hardships during the pandemic<sup>53</sup>. In the third study case, BAKAMLA was again involved against a Vietnam-flagged fishing vessel in December 2020. In an attempt to trick Indonesian authorities, BAKAMLA encountered a vessel, BT 95212, that illegally maneuvered the North Natuna Seas. At their disposal, this vessel contained 2 tons of fish and dried shark fins with no proper fishing documents<sup>54</sup>. In an attempted escape, BAKAMLA stated that they displayed the Indonesian flag to avoid possible raids by the authorities.

The last two cases involved the KKP, especially the vessels under the Directorate General of Marine and Fishery Resources Supervision. The first case occurred in April 2021, with KKP capturing five illegal Vietnam fishing boats at the same time<sup>55</sup>. These vessels had squid as their primary commodity target and decided to flee when approached by Indonesian officials. In this condition, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Maritime and Affairs and Fisheries, Antam Novambar, stated that capturing the five illegal boats was based on the governmental commitment not to compromise any illegitimate fishing activities on the sea boundaries<sup>56</sup>. Additionally, Indonesia was strengthening its surveillance capabilities in the North Natuna and Sulawesi Seas, as well as the Malacca Strait, due to the recent capture incidence. In April 2021, the second case involving the KKP was also observed, with the arrest of 2 Vietnam vessels poaching in the North Natuna Seas. This indicated that the patrol ship, Orca 03, managed to detain

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the KG 9307 TS and KNF 7727 vessels, after being caught tugging their pair trawl to catch fish<sup>59</sup>. After this event, the KKP continuously emphasized the importance of not conducting illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, with adequate and heavy punishments available for future poachers.




Figure 3: Location of the Vietnamese vessels in April 2022  
Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)

#### Assessing the characteristics of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

Based on the previous section, Indonesia responded to Vietnam's IUUF cases through the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP, depending on the site of captured. However, these contemporary diplomatic strategies had shifted and were no longer oriented to the traditional coercive medium, which involved the public destruction of illegal boats. When assessed based on Le Mièr's five-point framework, the MD strategy was found to contain a significant kinetic effect, policy sustenance through time (consistent responses), message explicitness, reactive features, as well as power balance absence between Vietnam and Indonesia. This allowed the oppressed country (Indonesia) to effectively compel its will during the response to trespassing vessels. Fig. 4 shows the level of the MD properties across the five study cases.

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


Figure 4. The characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

Based on the kinetic effect, an average to a significant level was observed in the MD strategies against Vietnam's IUUF within the North Natuna Seas. This was in line with some previous studies, where a significant kinetic effect signaled the importance of the objective at stake to adversaries. Through the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP, Indonesia was willing to achieve an extensive extent in protecting its sovereignty at sea. According to the study cases, the involvement of the BAKAMLA and Navy represented the tough stance of the country through the strategical utilizations aimed to compel adversaries to alter their actions. This supported the warning shots to the air and the ship platforms, as well as other aggressive maneuvers to stop the actions of IUUF. The intentionality of striking the target solidified Indonesia's intentions of essentially protecting its sovereignty and the North Natuna Seas. However, the last two cases indicated a decline in the kinetic effect (KE) conducted by Indonesian officials. This proved that the aspects of KE were majorly suppressed and present through the KKP, compared to previous cases, which contained the active use of military forces with the conduct of coercive actions. This included blockage, adversary movement prevention, and warning shots. Meanwhile, the study cases involving the KKP lacked a similar form, due to the main action of blocking, capturing, and seizing illegal ships in this aspect. This confirmed that the KKP cases contained insignificant kinetic effects to a specific extent, compared to the Indonesian Navy and BAKAMLA conditions. Therefore, the dominant kinetic effect in these strategies verified the intention of Indonesia to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas, by upholding international law and its desire to avoid futile conflicts with the opposing stakeholder.

All the study cases reflected the country's message explicitness, based on its claims in the North Natuna Seas. This was due to the messages being directly stated by the Indonesian officials during the crisis and post-event, where the actions, aims, resolve, and the consequences of violating its territory were transmitted to the Vietnam vessels. Based on this condition, the utilization of the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP fishing vessels were a clear indication of the country's intent, based on the normalization of its North Natuna Sea claims. This indicated that the active presence of Indonesian officials

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was the message being transmitted. Based on the substantive message, the country's officials were straightforward in explaining the methods by which Vietnam vessels illegally trespassed the sea boundaries. Therefore, Indonesia consistently implemented a policy normalizing its claims in the overall waters of the North Natuna Seas, despite inconclusive meetings between both countries in resolving the issue of EEZ and continental shelf boundaries. Based on the message explicitness, the transmission was not misconstrued or misinterpreted in any possible form. This enabled the difficulties of other stakeholders to implement a stance and subsequently place Indonesia at an advantage, in avoiding unnecessary escalation of conflicts. The trajectory of this stance also signified the difficulty level of the country towards future flexibility in the negotiations related to the North Natuna Seas. Indonesia was also confident with its claims in the North Natuna Seas, as the displayed explicitness showed possible future resolution under the country's preference. Despite the varying intensity, all five study cases indicated a strong element of explicitness in the transmitted messages. Based on the involvement of KKP, the intensity of explicitness was less considered compared to those related to the Navy and BAKAMLA. Moreover, KKP strictly disseminated the message of fishing-related activities only, not the overall security of the North Natuna Seas, such as the rhetoric used by the Navy and BAKAMLA.

Among the countries involved in the IUUF, the assessment of power balance also determined the future possibilities of the countries' stability and motivations. To achieve peace, the countries' intention was ideal towards similar power, indicating the presence of the balance factor. Vietnam and Indonesia's power balance was also asymmetrical, subsequently showing that the power balance was unequal. This placed Indonesia at an advantage, as their interests were exerted towards agreement implementation during when negotiations. In Southeast Asia, this country was also superior to Vietnam, as reflected by its GDP, military size, population, and ability to introduce international norms to regional organizations such as ASEAN. To a limited extent, Indonesia had been coercive in confronting illegal Vietnamese fishing ships in the North Natuna Seas, due to being unhesitant in displaying their water ownership, with the violating perpetrators of the international law being punished accordingly. Based on the Vietnam fishing vessels in all cases, the consequence of an unequal power balance showed great repercussions. According to Le Mière (2014), the presence of an asymmetrical balance led to a stronger power enforcing its policy references to the weaker country. This was feasible due to their relatively high power, compared to other groups. Due to being the stronger power perpetrating the water sovereignty protection through a limited coercive pathway, Indonesia reflected its willingness to completely claim the North Natuna Seas, while being rigid with future negotiations with Vietnam. Despite much optimism for the countries to compromise the issue of the EEZ and continental shelf, the asymmetrical power difference still enabled Indonesia to enforce intolerance within the delimitation of their sovereign waters.

In all the study cases displayed, clear indications of the policy being sustained through time were adequately present. This indicated that the regular utilization of the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP was a common policy for Indonesia. Several recent occurrences were also due to the decrease of coerciveness towards IUUF cases. In Jokowi's first presidential term, the establishment of a deterrent effect was emphasized through the public bombings of illegal fishing vessels. However, the policy was no longer conducted due to the public backlash attained from neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. Despite this condition, the decrease in coerciveness did not verify that the present implemented policy was newly introduced. This contained strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, warning shots, as well as capturing and seizing illegal ships. The

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contemporary actions by the Indonesian officials were still considered sustainable irrespective of these actions, due to being an extension of previous similar policies, to decrease IUUF in the country's sovereign waters. Therefore, this strategy was adequately sustained despite differing from the previous coercive levels conducted as an Indonesian maritime diplomatic strategy. This confirmed a clear attestation of the country's commitment to its North Natuna Sea policy. The final maritime diplomatic property to be assessed was the pre-emptive or reactive feature. Based on the pre-emptive condition, specific policies were planned to achieve a certain goal. This showed that the protagonist (Indonesia) was confident about its possible outcome when the policy was sustained and pre-emptively prepared, due to its unmoved stance. Meanwhile, the reactive feature was conducted based on an impromptu nature. Under this category, the events were subjected to the possibilities of uncertainties, as reactive maritime diplomacy did not provide sufficient time to prepare and plan actions. This led to a lack of ability in mapping possible scenarios to a specific event outcome. According to Le Mière (2014), reactive diplomacy was found to open bigger possibilities of the events evolving to become more dangerous and escalatory. Based on these results, all the study cases involved in this report were reactive. Furthermore, Indonesia continuously conducted the policies of strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, as well as warning shots against Vietnam's IUUF, which were performed as sources of response towards trespassing fishing ships. This diplomacy established greater uncertainties based on the orientation of the study cases' situations, as officials often encountered fishing boats under the disguise of the Indonesian flag, turning off their lights at midnight, and using aggressive maneuvers. Le Mière (2014) also stated that reactive policies were more dangerous due to the uncertainties and possibility of unforeseen escalations. To a specific extent, the crisis in the North Natuna Seas increased due to the impromptu and instinctive responses of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP. However, there was a line not exceeded by Indonesian officials, despite their reactive actions. This was based on not exceeding their traditional coerciveness in handling illegal ship poaching in the North Natuna Seas.

#### Policy Implications

Amidst the geopolitical and geostrategic adjustments in the Indo-Pacific, state actors were wary of coercive sea maneuvers. This indicated that Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas contained pivotal policy implications for regional security. Unlike the Chinese sustained maneuvers or the US Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea or Pacific Oceans, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy was reactive in confronting the Vietnamese IUUF. This confirmed that the strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, and warning shots against the IUUF vessels were a form of response towards trespassers on the sea boundaries. Therefore, Indonesia needs to showcase greater coerciveness in protecting its sea territory in specific future intrusion cases. Despite this aggressiveness, the country had never violated existing international laws and regulations. This uncertainty was contributed by the lack of power balance between Vietnam and Indonesia, due to the display of a more straightforward and coercive response by the protagonist, towards the IUUF vessels from the antagonist (Vietnam). Meanwhile, the actions were more reluctant in similarly responding to the Chinese fishing vessels. Indonesian forces were not also reluctant in the conduct of their maritime diplomatic strategies, due to being in a position to exert their interests against Vietnam. This indicated that continuous hostility was a possibility when Vietnam and Indonesia fails to conclude the UNCLOS provisional agreement on their overlapping EEZ claims. In the domains of kinetic effect, sustainment, and explicitness, Indonesia's

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maritime diplomatic strategy was considered consistent. This was because they are frequently explicit in coercing foreign trespassing ships through a military medium, to compel adversaries to alter their actions. They also conducted sustainable sea operations through the Indonesian law enforcement, including BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, and the Navy. Based on these results, all the Indonesian bodies need to synergize in countering IUUF cases, especially in Vietnam.

#### Conclusion

In the North Natuna Seas, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy had evolved with time, with Jokowi reorienting the policies to a more accommodative one for neighboring states, regarding the reduction of the sea coerciveness level. This indicated that a public display of illegal ship bombings had presently focused on the maritime capacities to undergo traditional activities, such as strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, as well as warning shots. Despite these adjustments, the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam had long been tarnished by the presence of the unresolved borders in the North Natuna Seas. This rising IUUF occurrence perpetrated by Vietnamese flagged-fishing vessels continuously increased the concerns in Jakarta, irrespective of the long history of cooperation in multilateral forums such as ASEAN.

This study assessed the MD strategies of Jokowi against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas, with five selected cases being evaluated for better understanding. These involved raids, captures, and seizures of illegal fishing boats infiltrating the waters between 2020-2021. Each study case also indicated the adequate responses of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, or KKP, confirming the country's intention to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas, although was willing to avoid needless water conflicts. Through Le Mière's five-point framework, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF exhibited the following: (1) heavy kinetic effect, (2) sustainment of policy through time (consistent responses), (3) message explicitness, (4) reactive diplomacy, and (5) lack of power balance between stakeholders.

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## Balasan Revisi Kedua:

### Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in the North Natuna Seas

The bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam have long been tarnished by the unresolved maritime borders surrounding the North Natuna Seas. Despite having a long history of cooperation in multilateral forums such as the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the increasing occurrence of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the North Natuna Seas continues to raise concern in Jakarta by vessels of different countries, including Vietnamese-flagged vessels. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate the maritime diplomatic strategies of the President Joko Widodo's administration against the encroachment of Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas. The study argues that although there have been hundreds of incidents, five analytical cases were evaluated in this paper based on their maritime diplomatic properties, to understand Jokowi's contemporary strategy within Indonesia's sea boundaries. These involved Indonesia's responses to illegal Vietnam fishing boats, which entered Indonesian waters in the North Natuna Seas between 2020-2021 with regard to 1) Indonesia's navy; (2) the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, and (3) Indonesian Police or Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery. According to Le Miere's five framework points, this country's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF exhibited the following: (1) heavily contained kinetic effect, (2) maintenance of policy through time (consistent responses), (3) message explicitness accompanying the diplomatic action, (4) more reactive diplomacy than pre-emptive strategy, and (5) lack of power balance between stakeholders. The results of the strategies reflected mildly coerced and sustained efforts to compel aggressors (in this case the Vietnamese) towards steering outside of Indonesia's sea boundaries, through raids, captures, and seizures of illegal fishing boats.

Keywords: maritime diplomacy; North Natuna Seas; IUUF; maritime borders

#### Introduction

Overlapping claims between Indonesia and Vietnam are continuously observed as an irritant to their bilateral relations in terms of the countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). This indicates that the continuous occurrence of contestations in the North Natuna Sea, where the maritime borders related to both countries' EEZ are found, are incomplete. In this condition, Vietnam commenced a single boundary for its EEZ and continental shelf, with Indonesia being persistent in placing its possession as separate entities<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore, the difficulty in completing these countries' maritime borders was not as complicated as other regional boundary tensions, leading to the signing of agreements allowing more extraordinary confidence-building measures in their bilateral relationships. Eventually there was an agreement on a comprehensive partnership in 2003, which was continuously observed with the implementation of a strategic relationship in 2013<sup>2</sup>. Despite continuing tensions at sea, the commitment of these countries to the establishment of peace is still observed by the vast number of completed maritime-related agreements, leading to greater collaboration. Vietnam and Indonesia also met in twelve negotiation rounds from 2010 to 2021, towards addressing the growing concern on the EEZ delimitation, as well as the elevation of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) in the North Natuna Sea<sup>3</sup>. Additionally, the conflicting legal positions between these countries are continuously observed as significant barriers to any definitive agreement, despite the expressed desires to resolve the growing issues.

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The incompleteness of the limitations within the maritime borders has reportedly led to an increased and staggering encroachment of Vietnamese fishing vessels into Indonesian waters. Between 2014-2019 (Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) first presidential term), this country had seized 488 illegal trespassing ships, with half of them being Vietnamese vessels. By 2020-2021, the interceptions of Vietnamese ships became a common occurrence for the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), Police (POLRI), Navy, as well as the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels (KKP). Jokowi also implemented a tough stance based on the country's maritime-related affairs. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. This leads to the specific consideration of five cases, which emphasized the illegal fishing boats trespassing the sea boundaries between 2020-2021. Despite the numerous Vietnamese intrusions in 2010 and 2021, emphasis in this study is only conducted on the cases where the vessels were caught by the Indonesian maritime security forces (KKP, BAKAMLA, or Indonesian Navy). The five selected cases also had similar action patterns, including (1) the use of destructive fishing practices and overfishing, (2) lack of communication between Vietnam fishing vessels and Indonesian maritime security forces, (3) the NFRS guarding the fishing vessel, and (4) the response of the KKP (Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries), BAKAMLA, POLRI, or Indonesian Navy. This indicates that the selected cases are based on the response of the KKP, BAKAMLA, POLRI, or Indonesian Navy, which led to the depiction of the numerous occurrences of Vietnamese IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

In constructing the maritime diplomatic strategies and policies, the five-point framework of Christian Le Miere was utilized in the assessment of events. Based on the specific characterization of each selected case to the conception of Le Miere, the trends of Indonesian diplomacy are subsequently gauged in the North Natuna Seas. This specifically emphasizes the correlation between Vietnam's IUUF and the involvement of its coastguards in several instances. After assessing these diplomatic strategies, an argument is also expected based on the criteria of kinetic effect, sustainment, reactivity, explicitness, and balance of power, as Indonesia opted to mildly implement coerced and sustained efforts towards compelling aggressors from Indonesian waters. The lack of studies on previous diplomatic strategies also contributes to the better trajectory assessment of future maritime events, especially in the North Natuna Seas. Therefore, the initial knowledge of Indonesia's contemporary stance is very important during maritime affairs. In the 2014 inaugural speech, the Indonesian grand strategy was outlined by the president towards the establishment of the Global Maritime Axis (GMA), which positioned the country as a strategic hub between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This led to the implementation of the internal and external foreign policies utilizing maritime potential. One of these internal highlights is the increase of connectivity among Indonesian islands, through the construction of a sea-based highway. Meanwhile, neighboring countries were found not to violate the country's territorial sea borders, as a cornerstone of the external policy. The strictness of this country also included the policy of the former KKP minister, Susi Pudjiastuti, in the deliberate bombing and sinking of the illegal fishing ships captured in various operations. In this public exhibition, most of the captured and sunk ships were found to originate from Malaysia, Vietnam, and China. Figure 1 illustrates the overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone between Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as the regions of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

Paul Chambers

Are you sure this is what you mean? You are saying that limitations within the borders are incomplete. I think you mean "The incompleteness of a delimited border"

Paul Chambers

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Paul Chambers

The others were mostly from China, I assume? I think you should at least mention this in a sentence.

Paul Chambers

The study argues that XXXX. Please place your study's argument (same as in the ABSTRACT here)

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So only 5 Vietnamese vessels have ever been caught?

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You lost me. What does this acronym stand for? Please write it.

Paul Chambers

Whose speech? If the president, give his full name.

Paul Chambers

In Asian Affairs journal, "period" or "," comes before "6". Please correct throughout paper.

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Paul Chambers

What kind of maritime potential? What does this mean?

Paul Chambers

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Paul Chambers

You mean that Indonesia's neighbors were not found to have violated the sea borders? But Vietnam did violate, right?

Paul Chambers

Strictness of the policy, right?




Figure 1: Location of the overlapping EEZ between Indonesia and Vietnam (White and Green border lines), as well as the region of the growing Vietnamese IUUF in Indonesian waters (2021)

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)<sup>9</sup>

The issue of IUUF is continuously conducted in these waters with every passing year, as China was found to continue its aggressive maneuvers in the North Natuna Seas. This involved the utilization of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and other non-military vessels, for the normalization of claims on these sea boundaries. During these previous years, the Vietnamese fishing vessels have also been a major contributor to encroachment in Indonesian waters. In 2021, the number of IUUF cases from these vessels reached an all-time high of 296 and 100 intrusions, according to the detections by the Citra Satellite and Automatic Identification System (Fig. 2). Despite this, Indonesia was only able to capture 38 illegally-trespassing Vietnam vessels, through BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, or the Navy (Table 1).




Figure 2: Illegal Vietnam fishing vessel intrusions detected in the North Natuna Seas in 2021 (AIS and Citra Satellite)

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022)<sup>10</sup>

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Table 1: The number of Vietnamese fishing vessels captured by the Indonesian maritime security law enforcement agencies in 2021

Institution	Number of illegal fishing ships caught
Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery (KKP)	25
Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA)	3
Indonesian Police (POLRI)	8
Indonesian Navy	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>38</b>

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022)<sup>11</sup>

On these waters, a growing normalization pattern of Vietnam IUUF was observed, subsequently elevating a tremendous concern for policymakers in Indonesia. Despite this, some academics have not significantly invested in understanding the maritime dynamics in the North Natuna Seas. Meanwhile, others observed that these dynamics only included the minor tensions between Indonesia and China, due to the involvement of the CCG<sup>12</sup>. Irrespective of the results obtained, less analysis was still performed to decipher the various maritime diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas, which should not be lightly considered. In previous years, the number of IUUF had considerably increased in the North Natuna and Sulawesi Seas, as well as the Strait of Malacca<sup>13</sup>. This indicated that the concerns of Jakarta were steadily growing with time, as Indonesia observed the IUUF occurrences as a sign to subsequently invest in patrols and secure its sovereignty at sea. In 2017, Jokowi announced that the name of this marine area would henceforth be called the 'North Natuna Seas', to display a tougher stance on the issue of the South China Sea and the growing number of IUUF incidents in Indonesia's northern territorial waters, aggressors. To solidify the EEZ rights of Indonesia, the policy of Jokowi was not baseless regarding the occurrence of concerning maneuvers in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, Indonesian vessels have not been hesitant to show their aggressiveness in the South China Sea, due to the gradually growing belligerence of Chinese strategies in expanding their sea boundaries, for example, through the creation of artificial lands. Chinese Coastguard Vessels (CCGs) also accompanied Chinese fishing vessels.<sup>14</sup> This indicated that the act of IUUF was a case of pre-emptive maritime policy, which is carefully constructed to normalize a specific regional claim. In all the selected study cases, the apprehended Vietnamese fishing vessels were accompanied by the VFRS (Vietnam Fisheries Resource Surveillance), indicating a suspicious trend for Indonesian policymakers. Therefore, the analysis of the ongoing Vietnam IUUF cases in the North Natuna Seas is very important, based on the investigation of maritime diplomatic characteristics embedded in each case.

#### Literature Review

The review of literature leading up to this study involve two major topics namely, (1) maritime diplomacy and (2) the analysis of Indonesia and Vietnam maritime-related tensions. Alfred Thayer Mahan, in 'The Influence of Historical Sea Power (1660-1783)' argued that sea power positioned the country with immense pleasure in protecting its vital water interest<sup>15</sup>. Based on the increase of competition at sea over time, security and dominance were very critical for great powers, to achieve specific national interests<sup>16</sup>. Besides these results, numerous critical reports were also continuously produced by Mahan on maritime diplomacy. Despite not directly referencing the terminology of this

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policy, the early works of this expert provided the argument on the developmental patterns of the sea's immense potential. They also provided the sea utilization patterns of the state actors, to achieve national interests<sup>17</sup>.

Based on the studies of Mahan, 'Gunboat Diplomacy' was introduced by James Cable. This explained that specific national agendas were achieved through coercive diplomacy, which involved the utilization of navies in this present study<sup>18</sup>. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, some previous reviews analyzed the impact of navies and other sea-based hard power assets to achieve national interests. Most of these reports specifically referenced the study cases from several locations<sup>19, 20, 21</sup>, with Le Mière (2014) mostly emphasized. This introduced the terminology of 'maritime diplomacy' with the threefold typology continuously used by study experts, namely coercive, persuasive, and cooperative policies<sup>22</sup>. It also explained that this typology aimed to capture the diversified forms of diplomatic events, which did not only contain coercive-based actions according to the stipulations of other previous GD (Gunboat Diplomacy) studies. However, the five-point framework was the ultimate contribution of Le Mière (2014), based on the assessment of maritime diplomatic events. This focused on the kinetic effect, message explicitness, event sustainability or abbreviation, reactive or pre-emptive conditions, as well symmetrical or asymmetrical power balance among conflicting actors<sup>23</sup>. The kinetic effect is the utilization level of active forces and coercive maneuvers in conducting a maritime diplomatic event. Meanwhile, the message explicitness depends on the assessment or non-assessment patterns of the aggressor on the intentions of the diplomatic event. The sustainability of events also focuses on the performance length of a specific operation. It is also part of a more extensive operation sustained through a certain period. When conducted diplomatic actions are only in response or not spontaneous to specific encounters, they are considered reactive and pre-emptive events, respectively. Subsequently, maritime diplomatic events are often characterized as symmetrical or asymmetrical actions, depending on the power balance of the conflict actors in the conflict. When considerable differences and similarities are observed in the actors' power balance, these events are considered to be asymmetrical and symmetrical, respectively.

Based on this review, the second discourse focused on Indonesia and Vietnam's maritime-related tensions. This excluded any arguments on the bilateral relations of these countries and specifically emphasized the tensions in the North Natuna Sea. Some previous studies are found to have majorly focused on the IUUF issues in these waters. Amidst the elevation of tensions, numerous possible solutions have reportedly been assessed, such as the arrangement of a joint agreement on fishing events<sup>24, 25</sup>. Furthermore, the study of Arsyad was optimistic about the solution to this issue through effective mutual understanding between Vietnam and Indonesia<sup>26</sup>. Special attention was also provided to the label of the waters as the North Natuna Sea, with several neighboring countries such as Vietnam, found to be clearly against it<sup>27</sup>. Despite this assessment, the most relevant results were still observed in Sasmita (2021), where a solid analysis of Indonesian maritime diplomacy (MD) was provided due to the threefold typology of Le Mière, including coercive, persuasive, and cooperative MD. This stated that the coercive, cooperative, and persuasive maritime diplomacy against the trespassers was based on vessel sinking, bilateral collaborative formation, and naval presence, respectively<sup>28</sup>. Despite citing Le Mière (2014), the study still characterized the numerous cases of diplomatic events conducted between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas.

Based on observation, the literature related to Indonesia and Vietnam's maritime diplomacy in the North Natuna Seas is scarce. However, a relevant and indirect discourse was observed on the dynamics of Indonesia and China within these sea boundaries. Although encroachments were majorly conducted by Vietnamese fishing boats, China's

**Paul Chambers**

Gunboat diplomacy was not introduced by James Cable in 1985. It was the name of a strategy used by great powers beginning in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Cable did not invent the term. Please elaborate on this term before mentioning GD studies.

**Paul Chambers**

What is the connection between Cable and Miere? Please elaborate. 1 sentence, please.

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claims in the North Natuna Seas were still a dominant academic discourse. In understanding the use of CCG and fishing vessels to illegally trespass these waters, the study of Maouf, Legionosuko, and Risman, analytically focused on Indonesia's calmness in confronting belligerent actors, such as China<sup>29</sup>. A geopolitical analysis of these events was also introduced by Tampi, to subsequently comprehend China's unique stance in the North Natuna Seas<sup>30</sup>. Despite these results, the study of Rosana, Dewi, and Agustin was found to be highly relevant to the discourse, due to focusing on possible tension resolutions and China's IUUF strategy on the waters<sup>31</sup>. This indicated that maritime diplomacy was understudied, especially in understanding the North Natuna Seas' events. Therefore, this present article aims to address these gaps through Le Mier's five-point framework, to interpret the diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas. This is expected to provide greater clarity to the trajectory of policies occurring between these countries. It is also expected to serve as an addition to the political dynamics unfolded between Indonesia and China in these waters.

### Methodology

In this analysis, five cases of Vietnam fishing encroachment were emphasized between 2020-2021. These involved the Indonesian Navy, KKP (Indonesia Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels), and BAKAMLA, as well as their response patterns to the IUUF issues on the sea boundaries. They were also selected between 2020-2021, during Jokowi's second presidential term. This was because some reports had accurately interpreted the Indonesian diplomatic strategy through coercive media, considering Jokowi's previous decisions not to compromise IUUF and conduct public bombardments of the illegal vessels<sup>32</sup>. In 2020-2021, Jokowi gradually retreated from the coercive-based strategy, as well as implemented a more peaceful and decisive approach to the IUUF issue in the North Natuna Seas. With Le Mier's five-point framework, the following maritime diplomatic properties were assessed,

1. Kinetic Effect: By assessing the kinetic and non-kinetic levels of a maritime diplomatic event, the significance of the objective is often signaled to the adversaries. This indicates that the use of military forces and coercive actions is a significant kinetic effect, such as aggressive maneuvers, targeted violence, and warning shots across the bow.
2. Symmetry or Asymmetry Power Balance: Asymmetrical events often show that more potent powers enforce their abilities towards the establishment of changes to a specific policy, i.e., balance is unequal among the aggressors. Meanwhile, symmetrical indicates equality in the balance of power.
3. Explicit, Implicit, or Unspoken Messages: In maritime diplomatic events, the intention of a protagonist is often clarified through the provided messages. This explains that explicitness ensures a minimum space for miscommunication, indicating a resolution based on the preferences of the announcer. Implicit messages are found to be commonly dangerous, due to the adoption of miscalculation and misinterpretation. Meanwhile, unspoken messages are highly observed as a strategic medium, to ensure the availability of all options for future negotiations.
4. Pre-emptive or Reactive Events: A pre-emptive diplomatic event is often planned with specific targeted goals, while reactive occurrences are commonly impromptu without proper long-term organization.
5. Sustained or Abbreviated Events: This assesses the length by which specific maritime events have been conducted over time.

This article perceives that Le Mige's five-point framework provides a strong analysis based on the trajectory of future maritime policies. This was because the Indo-Pacific region is presently an area containing geostrategic and geopolitical shifts, with rising tensions among regional hegemon. In previous decades, these tensions led to the misperception and miscalculation of policies among littoral and non-littoral states, leading to the necessity to possess a vivid analysis of regional actions. Using the five-point framework, policymakers were enlightened on several core domains, including the true intentions of initially perceived coercive maneuvers, to advance a state's adaptation ability towards future maritime policies. This assisted states in steering away from possible miscalculations and misperception of sea maneuvers, which is a critical element hindering the escalation of conflicts. In assessing the diplomatic properties of the selected cases, a radar chart was displayed to illustrate the extent of each subsequent characteristic. This qualitative study used the primary and secondary data related to Indonesia's MD strategies, in responding to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas within 2020-2021. Additionally, the illustrations in the radar charts were exhibited based on the following,

1. Kinetic Effects: Points were provided based on the extent of active forces and utilized military equipment, with the initial interpreted intentions being observed as hostile.
2. Symmetry: Points were provided when the level of power was similar among the conflicting states, based on one's influence in global affairs.
3. Explicitness: Points were provided based on the presence of clear communications during the event, subsequently highlighting the intentions of the actions.
4. Pre-emption or Reactive: Points were provided when the event was planned and not an impromptu response.
5. Sustainment: Points were provided based on a policy's continuous level.

#### Illustrating the study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

In the initial presidential term of Jokowi, no compromises were carried out with regard to cases of IUUF in any parts of the maritime borders. Based on the Minister of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Susi Pudjiastuti, Indonesia successfully securitized any IUUF actions through public bombings of the captured illegal fishing vessels<sup>33</sup>. During Jokowi's second presidential term, the country then adopted a different approach to responding to sea-based encroachments. This was based on the capture and seizure of illegal fishing boats, which did not require a similar policy of public bombings. Special reference was also provided to the following study cases, to represent the various intrusion cases made by Vietnam in terms of IUUF,

1. The Indonesian Maritime Security Agency chased down Vietnam fishing boats (July 2020),
2. Indonesian Navy apprehended two Vietnam fishing boats (October 2020),
3. A Vietnamese vessel bearing the Indonesian flag was captured by the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (December 2020),
4. Five Vietnamese fishing boats were seized by the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (April 2021),
5. The Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries captured two Vietnam fishing boats (April 2021).

This proved that the majority of fishing vessel encroachments into Indonesian waters originated from Vietnam. Due to many illegal trespasses on the North Natuna Seas, the oppressor (Vietnam) is attempting to normalize its claims over their EEZ

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Regarding 1) how many Vietnamese fishing boats did the IMSA chase down?  
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version, which collides with that of Indonesia over the North Natuna Seas. The active stakeholders responsible for the processes of seizing, capturing, and escorting these fishing vessels away from the waters were the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP. With gradual adjustment from a coercive-based diplomatic reaction, a subsequent assessment was needed in investigating the contemporary MD events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas. Most of the study cases presented in this article contained the illegal trespassing of Vietnamese fishing vessels on these sea boundaries, where BAKAMLA chased down a maneuvering boat in July 2020<sup>34</sup>. In this condition, the sailors endeavored to avoid arrest by speeding away and discarding their fishing nets. Their desperation to escape led to the burning of tires to minimize vision and continuous performance of zig-zag maneuvers, which were dangerous for other vessels in the area. Furthermore, the BAKAMLA's patrol boat (KN Pulau Dana-323) initially communicated with the fishing vessel without obtaining a response. This led to the maneuver around the vessel with a subsequent alert through semaphore signals. With no response obtained, BAKAMLA decided to take warning shots into the air and the fishing boat, subsequently arresting the crew with 2 tons of illegally caught fish<sup>35</sup>.

The second study case involved the Indonesian Navy and their apprehension of 2 Vietnam fishing boats, which sailed along the North Natuna Seas in October 2020. These boats conducted illegal fishing on Indonesia's continental shelf and ignited the immediate response of the Navy. In this condition, the country's KRI John Lie-358 underwent a one-hour chase down with the trespassing vessels, BV0908TS and BV499TS (TNI-AL 2020). This occurred at midnight, as the trespassing vessels turned off their lights and released their fishing nets. The Indonesian Navy continuously provided stoppage alerts and fired warning shots, before conducting a visit board search and seizure. In an official statement, the Navy stated that the responses were part of the Operation Koarmada I Marine Combat Group, which embraced the commitment to protecting Indonesian waters despite encountering operational hardships during the pandemic<sup>36</sup>.

In the third study case, BAKAMLA was again involved against a Vietnam-flagged fishing vessel in December 2020. Once again, an encroaching Vietnamese vessel illegally maneuvered into the North Natuna Sea. This vessel contained 2 tons of fish and dried shark fins with no proper fishing documents<sup>37</sup>. It attempted to evade capture, displaying the Indonesian flag to avoid possible raids by the authorities.

The last two cases involved the KKP, especially the vessels under the Directorate General of Marine and Fishery Resources Supervision. The first case occurred in April 2021, with KKP capturing five illegal Vietnam fishing boats at the same time<sup>38</sup>. These vessels had squid as their primary commodity target and decided to flee when approached by Indonesian officials. In this condition, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Maritime and Affairs and Fisheries, Antam Novambar, stated that capturing the five illegal boats was based on the government's commitment not to compromise with any illegitimate fishing groups on the sea boundaries<sup>39</sup>. Additionally, Indonesia was strengthening its surveillance capabilities in the North Natuna and Sulawesi Seas, as well as the Malacca Strait, due to the recent capture incidents. In April 2021, the second case involving the KKP was also observed, with the arrest of 2 Vietnam vessels poaching in the North Natuna Seas. This indicated that the patrol ship, Orca 03, managed to detain the KG 9307 TS and KNF 7727 vessels, after being caught tugging their pair trawl to catch fish<sup>40</sup>. After this event, the KKP continuously emphasized the importance of not conducting illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, with adequate and heavy punishments available for future poachers.

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Yes, you already told us.

**Paul Chambers**  
That is one case. This sentence implies that most of the cases are this one single case in July 2020. I think there is an English error.

**Paul Chambers**  
And this is all only one case? In July 2020?

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


Figure 3: Location of the Vietnamese vessels in April 2022  
Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)

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### Assessing the characteristics of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

Based on the previous section, Indonesia responded to Vietnam's IUUF cases through the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP, depending on the site of captured. However, these contemporary diplomatic strategies had shifted and were no longer oriented to the traditional coercive medium, which involved the public destruction of illegal boats. When assessed based on Le Mièrre's five-point framework, the MD strategy was found to contain a significant kinetic effect, policy sustenance through time (consistent responses), message explicitness, reactive features, as well as power balance absence between Vietnam and Indonesia. This allowed the oppressed country (Indonesia) to effectively compel its will during the response to trespassing vessels. Fig. 4 shows the level of the MD properties across the five study cases.




Figure 4. The characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

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Based on the kinetic effect, an average to a significant level was observed in the MD strategies against Vietnam's IUUF within the North Natuna Seas. This was in line with some previous studies, where a significant kinetic effect signaled the importance of the objective at stake to adversaries. Through the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP, Indonesia was willing to achieve an extensive extent in protecting its sovereignty at sea. According to the study cases, the involvement of the BAKAMLA and Navy represented the tough stance of the country through the strategic utilizations aimed to compel adversaries to alter their actions. This supported the warning shots to the air and the ship platforms, as well as other aggressive maneuvers to stop the actions of IUUF. The intentionality of striking the target solidified Indonesia's intentions of essentially protecting its sovereignty and the North Natuna Seas. However, the last two cases indicated a decline in the kinetic effect (KE) conducted by Indonesian officials. This proved that the aspects of KE were majorly suppressed and present through the KKP, compared to previous cases, which contained the active use of military forces with the conduct of coercive actions. This included blockage, adversary movement prevention, and warning shots. Meanwhile, the study cases involving the KKP lacked a similar form, due to the main action of blocking, capturing, and seizing illegal ships in this aspect. This confirmed that the KKP cases contained insignificant kinetic effects to a specific extent, compared to the Indonesian Navy and BAKAMLA conditions. Therefore, the dominant kinetic effect in these strategies verified the intention of Indonesia to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas, by upholding international law and its desire to avoid futile conflicts with the opposing stakeholder.

All the study cases reflected the country's message explicitness, based on its claims in the North Natuna Seas. This was due to the messages being directly stated by the Indonesian officials during the crisis and post-event, where the actions, aims, resolve, and the consequences of violating its territory were transmitted to the Vietnam vessels. Based on this condition, the utilization of the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP fishing vessels were a clear indication of the country's intent, based on the normalization of its North Natuna Sea claims. This indicated that the active presence of Indonesian officials was the message being transmitted. Based on the substantive message, the country's

officials were straightforward in explaining the methods by which Vietnam vessels illegally trespassed the sea boundaries. Therefore, Indonesia consistently implemented a policy normalizing its claims in the overall waters of the North Natuna Seas, despite inconclusive meetings between both countries in resolving the issue of EEZ and continental shelf boundaries. Based on the message explicitness, the transmission was not misconstrued or misinterpreted in any possible form. This enabled the difficulties of other stakeholders to implement a stance and subsequently place Indonesia at an advantage, in avoiding unnecessary escalation of conflicts. The trajectory of this stance also signified the difficulty level of the country towards future flexibility in the negotiations related to the North Natuna Seas. Indonesia was also confident with its claims in the North Natuna Seas, as the displayed explicitness showed possible future resolution under the country's preference. Despite the varying intensity, all five study cases indicated a strong element of explicitness in the transmitted messages. Based on the involvement of KKP, the intensity of explicitness was less considered compared to those related to the Navy and BAKAMLA. Moreover, KKP strictly disseminated the message of fishing-related activities only, not the overall security of the North Natuna Seas, such as the rhetoric used by the Navy and BAKAMLA.

Among the countries involved in the IUUF, the assessment of power balance also determined the future possibilities of the countries' stability and motivations. To achieve peace, the countries' intention was ideal towards similar power, indicating the presence of the balance factor. Vietnam and Indonesia's power balance was also asymmetrical, subsequently showing that the power balance was unequal. This placed Indonesia at an advantage, as their interests were exerted towards agreement implementation during when negotiations. In Southeast Asia, this country was also superior to Vietnam, as reflected by its GDP, military size, population, and ability to introduce international norms to regional organizations such as ASEAN. To a limited extent, Indonesia had been coercive in confronting illegal Vietnamese fishing ships in the North Natuna Seas, due to being unhesitant in displaying their water ownership, with the violating perpetrators of the international law being punished accordingly. Based on the Vietnam fishing vessels in all cases, the consequence of an unequal power balance showed great repercussions. According to Le Mière (2014), the presence of an asymmetrical balance led to a stronger power enforcing its policy references to the weaker country. This was feasible due to their relatively high power, compared to other groups. Due to being the stronger power perpetrating the water sovereignty protection through a limited coercive pathway, Indonesia reflected its willingness to completely claim the North Natuna Seas, while being rigid with future negotiations with Vietnam. Despite much optimism for the countries to compromise the issue of the EEZ and continental shelf, the asymmetrical power difference still enabled Indonesia to enforce intolerance within the delimitation of their sovereign waters.

In all the study cases displayed, clear indications of the policy being sustained through time were adequately present. This indicated that the regular utilization of the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP was a common policy for Indonesia. Several recent occurrences were also due to the decrease of coerciveness towards IUUF cases. In Jokowi's first presidential term, the establishment of a deterrent effect was emphasized through the public bombings of illegal fishing vessels. However, the policy was no longer conducted due to the public backlash from neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. Despite this condition, the decrease in coerciveness did not verify that the present implemented policy was newly introduced. This contained strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, warning shots, as well as capturing and seizing illegal ships. The contemporary actions by the Indonesian officials were still considered sustainable

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irrespective of these actions, due to being an extension of previous similar policies, to decrease IUUF in the country's sovereign waters. Therefore, this strategy was adequately sustained despite differing from the previous coercive levels conducted as an Indonesian maritime diplomatic strategy. This confirmed a clear attestation of the country's commitment to its North Natuna Sea policy. The final maritime diplomatic property to be assessed was the pre-emptive or reactive feature. Based on the pre-emptive condition, specific policies were planned to achieve a certain goal. This showed that the protagonist (Indonesia) was confident about its possible outcome when the policy was sustained and pre-emptively prepared, due to its unmoved stance. Meanwhile, the reactive feature was conducted based on an impromptu nature. Under this category, the events were subjected to the possibilities of uncertainties, as reactive maritime diplomacy did not provide sufficient time to prepare and plan actions. This led to a lack of ability in mapping possible scenarios to a specific event outcome. According to Le Mjerg (2014), reactive diplomacy was found to open greater possibilities when events evolved to become more dangerous and escalatory. Based on the findings in the case at hand, all the study cases involved in this report were represented reactive diplomacy as such. Furthermore, Indonesia continuously conducted the policies of strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, as well as warning shots against Vietnam's IUUF, which were performed as sources of response towards trespassing fishing ships. This diplomacy established greater uncertainties based on the orientation of the study cases' situations, as officials often encountered fishing boats under the disguise of the Indonesian flag, turning off their lights at midnight, and using aggressive maneuvers. Le Mjerg (2014) also stated that reactive policies were more dangerous due to the uncertainties and possibility of unforeseen escalations. To a specific extent, the crisis in the North Natuna Seas increased due to the impromptu and instinctive responses of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP. However, there was a line not exceeded by Indonesian officials, despite their reactive actions. This was based on not exceeding their traditional coerciveness in handling illegal ship poaching in the North Natuna Seas.

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#### Policy Implications

Amidst the geopolitical and geostrategic adjustments in the Indo-Pacific, state actors were wary of coercive sea maneuvers. This indicated that Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas contained pivotal policy implications for regional security. Unlike the Chinese sustained maneuvers in its claimed "dash lines" of the South China Sea or the US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea or Pacific Oceans, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy was reactive in confronting the Vietnamese IUUF. This confirmed that the strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, and warning shots against the IUUF vessels were a form of response towards trespassers on the sea boundaries. Therefore, Indonesia needs to showcase greater coerciveness in protecting its sea territory in specific future intrusion cases. Despite this aggressiveness, the country had never violated existing international laws and regulations. This uncertainty was contributed by the lack of power balance between Vietnam and Indonesia, due to the display of a more straightforward and coercive response by the protagonist, towards the IUUF vessels from the antagonist (Vietnam). Meanwhile, the actions were more reluctant in similarly responding to the Chinese fishing vessels. Indonesian forces were not also reluctant in the conduct of their maritime diplomatic strategies, due to being in a position to exert their interests against Vietnam. This indicated that continuous hostility was a possibility when Vietnam and Indonesia failed to conclude the UNCLOS provisional agreement on their overlapping EEZ claims. In the domains of kinetic effect, sustainment, and explicitness, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic

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strategy was considered consistent. This was because they are frequently explicit in coercing foreign trespassing ships through a military medium, to compel adversaries to alter their actions. They also conducted sustainable sea operations through the Indonesian law enforcement, including BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, and the Navy. Based on these results, all the Indonesian bodies need to synergize in countering IUUF cases, especially in Vietnam.

### Conclusion

In the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy has evolved with time, with Jokowi reorienting the policies to a more accommodative one for neighboring states, regarding the reduction of the sea coerciveness level. This has indicated that a public display of illegal ship bombings had presently focused on the maritime capacities to undergo traditional activities, such as strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, as well as warning shots. Despite these adjustments, tensions remain between Indonesia and Vietnam at least partly because of the still unresolved ocean boundaries between the two countries in the North Natuna Sea. The unresolved boundaries has led to a rising number of IUUF occurrence, perpetrated by Vietnamese flagged-fishing vessels. These have increased concerns in Jakarta, irrespective of the long history of cooperation among Southeast Asian countries in multilateral forums such as ASEAN.

This study assessed the MD strategies of Jokowi against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas, with five selected cases being evaluated for better understanding. These cases involved Indonesian governmental raids, captures, and seizures of illegal fishing boats infiltrating Indonesia's waters between 2020-2021. Each study case also indicated the adequate responses of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, or KKP, confirming the country's intention to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas, although it was willing to avoid needless water conflicts. Through Le Mieng's five-point framework, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF exhibited the following, (1) heavy kinetic effect, (2) sustainment of policy through time (consistent responses), (3) message explicitness, 4) reactive diplomacy, and (5) lack of power balance between stakeholders

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## Revisi Ketiga:

**Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in the North Natuna Seas**

The bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam have long been tarnished by the unresolved maritime borders surrounding the North Natuna Seas. Despite having a long history of cooperation in multilateral forums such as the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the increasing occurrence of IUUF (illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing) in the North Natuna Seas continues to raise concern in Jakarta by vessels of different countries, including Vietnamese-flagged vessels. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate the maritime diplomatic strategies of the President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration against the encroachment of Vietnam fishing boats which entered Indonesian waters in the North Natuna Seas between 2020-2021 with reference to the response of 1) Indonesia's navy; (2) the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, and (3) Indonesian Police or Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. The study argues that according to Le Miere's five framework points, this country's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF exhibited the following: (1) heavily contained kinetic effect, (2) maintenance of policy through time (consistent responses), (3) message explicitness accompanying the diplomatic action, (4) more reactive diplomacy than pre-emptive strategy, and (5) lack of power balance between stakeholders. The study also argued that the strategies reflected mildly coerced and sustained efforts to compel aggressors (in this case the Vietnamese) towards steering outside of Indonesia's sea boundaries, through raids, captures, and seizures of illegal fishing boats.

Keywords: maritime diplomacy; North Natuna Seas; IUUF; maritime borders

**Introduction**

Overlapping claims between Indonesia and Vietnam are continuously observed as an irritant to their bilateral relations in terms of the countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). This indicates that the continuous occurrence of contestations in the North Natuna Sea, where the maritime borders related to both countries' EEZ are found, are incomplete. In this condition, Vietnam commenced a single boundary for its EEZ and continental shelf, with Indonesia being persistent in placing its possession as separate entities.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the difficulty in completing these countries' maritime borders was not as complicated as other regional boundary tensions, leading to the signing of agreements allowing more extraordinary confidence-building measures in their bilateral relationships. Eventually there was an agreement on a comprehensive partnership in 2003, which was continuously observed with the implementation of a strategic relationship in 2013.<sup>2</sup> Regardless of the continuing tensions at sea, the commitment of these countries to the establishment of peace is still observed by the vast number of completed maritime-related agreements, leading to greater collaboration. Vietnam and Indonesia also met in twelve negotiation rounds from 2010 to 2021, towards addressing the growing concern on the EEZ delimitation, as well as the elevation of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) in the North Natuna Sea.<sup>3</sup> Despite so, in spite of the expressed desire to resolve the conflicting legal positions through confidence building measures, rounds of negotiations, and the establishment of a strategic partnership, Indonesia and Vietnam have yet to conclude the overlapping EEZ claims.

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The incompleteness of a delimited maritime boundary of Indonesia and Vietnam has reportedly led to an increased and staggering encroachment of Vietnamese fishing vessels into Indonesian waters. Between 2014-2019 (Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) first presidential term), this country had seized 488 illegal trespassing ships, with half of them being Vietnamese vessels, and the other majority being vessels originating from China.<sup>4</sup> By 2020-2021, the interceptions of Vietnamese ships became a common occurrence for the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), Police (POLRI), Navy, as well as the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels (KKP). Jokowi also implemented a tough stance based on the country's maritime-related affairs.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, this study aims to evaluate Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas. It is later argued in this article that Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF exhibited the following: (1) heavily contained kinetic effect, (2) maintenance of policy through time (consistent responses), (3) message explicitness accompanying the diplomatic action, (4) more reactive diplomacy than preemptive strategy, and (5) lack of power balance between stakeholders.

Special reference is given to five cases of illegal fishing boats trespassing the sea boundaries between 2020-2021, which were caught by Indonesian officials. The five selected cases had similar action patterns with the hundreds of Vietnam IUUF that occurred in the North Natuna Seas, including (1) the use of destructive fishing practices and overfishing, (2) lack of communication between Vietnam fishing vessels and Indonesian maritime security forces, (3) the VFRS (Vietnam Fisheries Resource Surveillance) guarding the fishing vessel, and (4) effectively responded by the KKP (Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries), BAKAMLA (Indonesian Maritime Security Agency), POLRI (Indonesian Police), or Indonesian Navy. This indicates that the selected cases are based on the response of the KKP, BAKAMLA, POLRI, or Indonesian Navy, which led to the depiction of the numerous occurrences of Vietnamese IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

In constructing the maritime diplomatic strategies and policies, the five-point framework of Christian Le Mière was utilized in the assessment of events. Based on the specific characterization of each selected case to the conception of Le Mière, the trends of Indonesian diplomacy are subsequently gauged in the North Natuna Seas. This specifically emphasizes the correlation between Vietnam's IUUF and the involvement of its coastguards in several instances. After assessing these diplomatic strategies, an argument is also expected based on the criteria of kinetic effect, sustainment, reactivity, explicitness, and balance of power, as Indonesia opted to mildly implement coerced and sustained efforts towards compelling aggressors from Indonesian waters. The lack of studies on previous diplomatic strategies also contributes to the better trajectory assessment of future maritime events, especially in the North Natuna Seas. Therefore, the initial knowledge of Indonesia's contemporary stance is very important during maritime affairs. In Joko Widodo's 2014 inaugural speech, the Indonesian grand strategy was outlined by the president towards the establishment of the Global Maritime Axis (GMA), which positioned the country as a strategic hub between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.<sup>6</sup> This led to the implementation of the internal and external foreign policies utilizing this geographical maritime potential to further advance Indonesia's national interests. One of these internal highlights is the increase of connectivity among Indonesian islands, through the construction of a sea-based highway.<sup>7</sup> Outwards, Indonesia has shown its strict stance when it comes to violations of Indonesia's EEZ. An example of this is the policy of the former KKP minister, Susi Pudjiastuti, in the deliberate bombing and sinking of the illegal fishing ships captured in various operations.<sup>8</sup> In this public exhibition, most of the captured and sunk ships were found to originate from Malaysia, Vietnam, and China.

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Figure 1 illustrates the overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone between Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as the regions of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.




Figure 1: Location of the overlapping EEZ between Indonesia and Vietnam (White and Green border lines), as well as the region of the growing Vietnamese IUUF in Indonesian waters (2021)

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)<sup>9</sup>

The issue of IUUF is continuously conducted in these waters with every passing year, as China was found to continue its aggressive maneuvers in the North Natuna Seas. This involved the utilization of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and other non-military vessels, for the normalization of claims on these sea boundaries. During these previous years, the Vietnamese fishing vessels have also been a major contributor to encroachment in Indonesian waters. In 2021, the number of IUUF cases from these vessels reached an all-time high of 296 and 100 intrusions, according to the detections by the Citra Satellite and Automatic Identification System (Fig. 2). Despite this, Indonesia was only able to capture 38 illegally-trespassing Vietnam vessels, through BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, or the Navy (Table 1).

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


Figure 2: Illegal Vietnam fishing vessel intrusions detected in the North Natuna Seas in 2021 (AIS and Citra Satellite)

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022)<sup>10</sup>

Table 1: The number of Vietnamese fishing vessels captured by the Indonesian maritime security law enforcement agencies in 2021

Institution	Number of illegal fishing ships caught
Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery (KKP)	25
Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA)	3
Indonesian Police (POLRI)	8
Indonesian Navy	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>38</b>

Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2022)<sup>11</sup>

On these waters, a growing normalization pattern of Vietnam IUUF was observed, subsequently elevating a tremendous concern for policymakers in Indonesia. Despite this, some academics have not significantly invested in understanding the maritime dynamics in the North Natuna Seas. Meanwhile, others observed that these dynamics only included the minor tensions between Indonesia and China, due to the involvement of the CCG.<sup>12</sup> Irrespective of the results obtained, less analysis was still performed to decipher the various maritime diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas, which should not be lightly considered. In previous years, the number of IUUF had considerably increased in the North Natuna and Sulawesi Seas, as well as the Strait of Malacca.<sup>13</sup> This indicated that the concerns of Jakarta were steadily growing with time, as Indonesia observed the IUUF occurrences as a sign to subsequently invest in patrols and secure its sovereignty at sea. In 2017, Jokowi announced that the name of this marine area would henceforth be called the "North Natuna Seas," to display a tougher stance on the issue of the South China Sea and the growing number of IUUF incidents in Indonesia's northern territorial waters. To solidify the EEZ rights of Indonesia, the policy of Jokowi was not baseless regarding the occurrence of concerning maneuvers in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, Indonesian vessels have not been hesitant to show their aggressiveness in the South China Sea, due to the gradually growing belligerence of Chinese strategies in expanding their sea boundaries, for example, through the creation of artificial lands. Chinese Coastguard Vessels (CCGs) also accompanied Chinese fishing vessels.<sup>14</sup> This indicated that the act of IUUF was a case of pre-emptive maritime policy, which is carefully constructed to normalize a specific regional claim. In all the selected study cases, the apprehended Vietnamese fishing vessels were accompanied by the VFRS, indicating a suspicious trend for Indonesian policymakers. Therefore, the analysis of the ongoing Vietnam IUUF cases in the North Natuna Seas is very important, based on the investigation of maritime diplomatic characteristics embedded in each case.

#### Literature Review

The review of literature leading up to this study involve two major topics namely, (1) maritime diplomacy and (2) the analysis of Indonesia and Vietnam maritime-related tensions. Alfred Thayer Mahan, in 'The Influence of Historical Sea Power (1660-1783)' argued that sea power positioned the country to protecting its vital water interest.<sup>15</sup> Based on the increase of competition at sea over time, security and dominance were very critical for great powers, to achieve specific national interests.<sup>16</sup> Besides these results, numerous critical reports were also continuously produced by Mahan on maritime diplomacy.

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Despite not directly referencing the terminology of this policy, the early works of this expert provided the argument on the developmental patterns of the sea's immense potential. They also provided the sea utilization patterns of the state actors, to achieve national interests.<sup>17</sup>

James Cable contributed immensely to the discourse of maritime diplomacy, by specifically examining the phenomena of 'gunboat diplomacy' in world affairs. Gunboat diplomacy is the utilization of naval power to intimidate other states to grant concessions.

<sup>18</sup> This explained that specific national agendas were achieved through coercive diplomacy, which involved the utilization of navies in this present study.<sup>19</sup> In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, some previous reviews analyzed the impact of navies and other sea-based hard power assets to achieve national interests. Most of these reports specifically referenced the study cases from several locations,<sup>21,22</sup> with Le Miège (2014) mostly emphasized. This introduced the terminology of 'maritime diplomacy' with the threefold typology continuously used by study experts, namely coercive, persuasive, and cooperative policies.<sup>23</sup> It also explained that this typology aimed to capture the diversified forms of diplomatic events, which did not only contain coercive-based actions according to the stipulations of other previous GD (Gunboat Diplomacy) studies. Early works by Cable were then elaborated by Le Miège, as he attempted to expand the discourse of maritime diplomacy to also include non-coercive maritime conducts, and the inclusion of non-state actors in analyzing maritime diplomacy, which exceeds prior debates related to only GD.

The five-point framework was the ultimate contribution of Le Miège (2014), which acts as a guideline to assess the significance of maritime diplomatic events. This focused on the kinetic effect, message explicitness, event sustainability or abbreviation, reactive or pre-emptive conditions, as well symmetrical or asymmetrical power balance among conflicting actors.<sup>24</sup> The kinetic effect is the utilization level of active forces and coercive maneuvers in conducting a maritime diplomatic event. Meanwhile, the message explicitness depends on the assessment or non-assessment patterns of the aggressor on the intentions of the diplomatic event. The sustainability of events also focuses on the performance length of a specific operation. It is also part of a more extensive operation sustained through a certain period. When conducted diplomatic actions are only in response or not spontaneous to specific encounters, they are considered reactive and pre-emptive events, respectively. Subsequently, maritime diplomatic events are often characterized as symmetrical or asymmetrical actions, depending on the power balance of the conflict actors in the conflict. When considerable differences and similarities are observed in the actors' power balance, these events are considered to be asymmetrical and symmetrical, respectively.

Based on this review, the second discourse focused on Indonesia and Vietnam's maritime-related tensions. This excluded any arguments on the bilateral relations of these countries and specifically emphasized the tensions in the North Natuna Sea. Some previous studies are found to have majorly focused on the IUUF issues in these waters. Amidst the elevation of tensions, numerous possible solutions have reportedly been assessed, such as the arrangement of a joint agreement on fishing events.<sup>25,26</sup> Furthermore, the study of Arsyad was optimistic about the solution to this issue through effective mutual understanding between Vietnam and Indonesia.<sup>27</sup> Special attention was also provided to the label of the waters as the North Natuna Sea, with several neighboring countries such as Vietnam, found to be clearly against it.<sup>28</sup> Despite this assessment, the most relevant results were still observed in Sasmita (2021), where a solid analysis of Indonesian maritime diplomacy (MD) was provided due to the threefold typology of Le Miège, including coercive, persuasive, and cooperative MD. This stated that the coercive, cooperative, and persuasive maritime diplomacy against the trespassers was based on

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vessel sinking, bilateral collaborative formation, and naval presence, respectively.<sup>29</sup> Despite citing Le Mièrre (2014), the study still characterized the numerous cases of diplomatic events conducted between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas.

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Based on observation, the literature related to Indonesia and Vietnam's maritime diplomacy in the North Natuna Seas is scarce. However, a relevant and indirect discourse was observed on the dynamics of Indonesia and China within these sea boundaries. Although encroachments were majorly conducted by Vietnamese fishing boats, China's claims in the North Natuna Seas were still a dominant academic discourse. In understanding the use of CCG and fishing vessels to illegally trespass these waters, the study of Ma'arif, Legionosuko, and Risman analytically focused on Indonesia's calmness in confronting belligerent actors, such as China.<sup>30</sup> A geopolitical analysis of these events was also introduced by Tammi, to subsequently comprehend China's unique stance in the North Natuna Seas.<sup>31</sup> Despite these results, the study of Rosana, Dwi, and Agustin was found to be highly relevant to the discourse, due to focusing on possible tension resolutions and China's IUUF strategy on the waters.<sup>32</sup> This indicated that maritime diplomacy was understudied, especially in understanding the North Natuna Seas' events. Therefore, this present article aims to address these gaps through Le Mièrre's five-point framework, to interpret the diplomatic events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas. This is expected to provide greater clarity to the trajectory of policies occurring between these countries. It is also expected to serve as an addition to the political dynamics unfolded between Indonesia and China in these waters.

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### Methodology

In this analysis, five cases of Vietnam fishing encroachment were emphasized between 2020-2021. These involved the Indonesian Navy, KKP (Indonesia Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery vessels), and BAKAMLA, as well as their response patterns to the IUUF issues on the sea boundaries. They were also selected between 2020-2021, during Jokowi's second presidential term. This was because some reports had accurately interpreted the Indonesian diplomatic strategy through coercive media, considering Jokowi's previous decisions not to compromise IUUF and conduct public bombardments of the illegal vessels.<sup>33</sup> In 2020-2021, Jokowi gradually retreated from the coercive-based strategy, as well as implemented a more peaceful and decisive approach to the IUUF issue in the North Natuna Seas. With Le Mièrre's five-point framework, the following maritime diplomatic properties were assessed,

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1. Kinetic Effect: By assessing the kinetic and non-kinetic levels of a maritime diplomatic event, the significance of the objective is often signaled to the adversaries. This indicates that the use of military forces and coercive actions is a significant kinetic effect, such as aggressive maneuvers, targeted violence, and warning shots across the bow.
2. Symmetry or Asymmetry Power Balance: Asymmetrical events often show that more potent powers enforce their abilities towards the establishment of changes to a specific policy, i.e., balance is unequal among the aggressors. Meanwhile, symmetrical indicates equality in the balance of power.
3. Explicit, Implicit, or Unspoken Messages: In maritime diplomatic events, the intention of a protagonist is often clarified through the provided messages. This explains that explicitness ensures a minimum space for miscommunication, indicating a resolution based on the preferences of the announcer. Implicit messages are found to be commonly dangerous, due to the adoption of miscalculation and misinterpretation. Meanwhile, unspoken messages are highly

observed as a strategic medium, to ensure the availability of all options for future negotiations.

4. Pre-emptive or Reactive Events: A pre-emptive diplomatic event is often planned with specific targeted goals, while reactive occurrences are commonly impromptu without proper long-term organization.
5. Sustained or Abbreviated Events: This assesses the length by which specific maritime events have been conducted over time.

This article perceives that Le Mijic's five-point framework provides a strong analysis based on the trajectory of future maritime policies. This was because the Indo-Pacific region is presently an area containing geostrategic and geopolitical shifts, with rising tensions among regional hegemon. In previous decades, these tensions led to the misperception and miscalculation of policies among littoral and non-littoral states, leading to the necessity to possess a vivid analysis of regional actions. Using the five-point framework, policymakers were enlightened on several core domains, including the true intentions of initially perceived coercive maneuvers, to advance a state's adaptation ability towards future maritime policies. This assisted states in steering away from possible miscalculations and misperception of sea maneuvers, which is a critical element hindering the escalation of conflicts. In assessing the diplomatic properties of the selected cases, a radar chart was displayed to illustrate the extent of each subsequent characteristic. This qualitative study used the primary and secondary data related to Indonesia's MD strategies, in responding to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas within 2020-2021. Additionally, the illustrations in the radar charts were exhibited based on the following.

1. Kinetic Effects: Points were provided based on the extent of active forces and utilized military equipment, with the initial interpreted intentions being observed as hostile.
2. Symmetry: Points were provided when the level of power was similar among the conflicting states, based on one's influence in global affairs.
3. Explicitness: Points were provided based on the presence of clear communications during the event, subsequently highlighting the intentions of the actions.
4. Pre-emption or Reactive: Points were provided when the event was planned and not an impromptu response.
5. Sustainment: Points were provided based on a policy's continuous level.

#### Illustrating the study cases of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic characteristics against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

In the initial presidential term of Jokowi, no compromises were carried out with regard to cases of IUUF in any parts of the maritime borders. Based on the Minister of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Susi Pudjiastuti, Indonesia successfully securitized any IUUF actions through public bombings of the captured illegal fishing vessels.<sup>34</sup> During Jokowi's second presidential term, the country then adopted a different approach to responding to sea-based encroachments. This was based on the capture and seizure of illegal fishing boats, which did not require a similar policy of public bombings. Special reference was also provided to the following study cases, to represent the various intrusion cases made by Vietnam in terms of IUUF.

1. The Indonesian Maritime Security Agency chased down Vietnam fishing boats (July 2020),
2. Indonesian Navy apprehended two Vietnam fishing boats (October 2020),
3. A Vietnamese vessel bearing the Indonesian flag was captured by the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (December 2020),

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4. Five Vietnamese fishing boats were seized by the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (April 2021).

5. The Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries captured two Vietnam fishing boats (April 2021).

Due to many illegal trespasses on the North Natuna Seas, the oppressor (Vietnam) is attempting to normalize its claims over their EEZ version, which collides with that of Indonesia over the North Natuna Seas. With gradual adjustment from a coercive-based diplomatic reaction, a subsequent assessment was needed in investigating the contemporary MD events between Indonesia and Vietnam in the North Natuna Seas. One of the study cases of illegal trespassing conducted by Vietnamese fishing vessels on these sea boundaries include a case where BAKAMLA chased down a maneuvering boat in July 2020.<sup>35</sup> In this condition, the sailors endeavored to avoid arrest by speeding away and discarding their fishing nets. Their desperation to escape led to the burning of tires to minimize vision and continuous performance of zig-zag maneuvers, which were dangerous for other vessels in the area. Furthermore, the BAKAMLA's patrol boat (KN Pulau, Dana-323) initially communicated with the fishing vessel without obtaining a response. This led to the maneuver around the vessel with a subsequent alert through semaphore signals. With no response obtained, BAKAMLA decided to take warning shots into the air and the fishing boat, subsequently arresting the crew with 2 tons of illegally caught fish.<sup>36</sup>

The second study case involved the Indonesian Navy and their apprehension of two Vietnam fishing boats, which sailed along the North Natuna Seas in October 2020. These boats conducted illegal fishing on Indonesia's continental shelf and ignited the immediate response of the Navy. In this condition, the country's KRI John Lie-358 underwent a one-hour chase down against the trespassing vessels, BV0908TS and BV499TS. This occurred at midnight, as the trespassing vessels turned off their lights and released their fishing nets. The Indonesian Navy continuously provided stoppage alerts and fired warning shots, before conducting a visit board search and seizure. In an official statement, the Navy stated that the responses were part of the Operation Koarmada I Marine Combat Group, which embraced the commitment to protecting Indonesian waters despite encountering operational hardships during the pandemic.<sup>37</sup>

In the third study case, BAKAMLA was again involved against a Vietnam-flagged fishing vessel in December 2020. Once again, an encroaching Vietnamese vessel illegally maneuvered into the North Natuna Sea. This vessel contained two tons of fish and dried shark fins with no proper fishing documents.<sup>38</sup> It attempted to evade capture by displaying the Indonesian flag to avoid possible raids by the authorities.

The last two cases involved the KKP, especially the vessels under the supervision of the Directorate General of Marine and Fishery Resources. The first case occurred in April 2021, with KKP capturing five illegal Vietnam fishing boats at the same time.<sup>39</sup> These vessels had squid as their primary commodity target and decided to flee when approached by Indonesian officials. In this condition, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Maritime and Affairs and Fisheries, Antan Novanbar, stated that capturing the five illegal boats was based on the government's commitment not to compromise with any illegitimate fishing groups on the sea boundaries.<sup>40</sup> Additionally, Indonesia strengthened its surveillance capabilities in the North Natuna and Sulawesi Seas, as well as the Malacca Strait, due to the recent capture incidents. In April 2021, the second case involving the KKP was also observed, with the arrest of two Vietnam vessels poaching in the North Natuna Seas. This indicated that the patrol ship, Orca 03, managed to detain the KG 9307 TS and KNF 7727 vessels after being caught tugging their pair trawl to catch fish.<sup>41</sup> After this event, the KKP continuously emphasized the importance of not

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conducting illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, with adequate and heavy punishments available for future poachers.




Figure 3: Location of the Vietnamese vessels in April 2022  
Source: Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (2021)

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#### Assessing the characteristics of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy to Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas

Based on the previous section, Indonesia responded to Vietnam's IUUF cases through the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP, depending on the site of captured. However, these contemporary diplomatic strategies had shifted and were no longer oriented to the traditional coercive medium, which involved the public destruction of illegal boats. When assessed based on Le Micoc's five-point framework, the MD strategy was found to contain a significant kinetic effect, policy sustenance through time (consistent responses), message explicitness, reactive features, as well as power balance absence between Vietnam and Indonesia. This allowed the oppressed country (Indonesia) to effectively compel its will during the response to trespassing vessels. Fig. 4 shows the level of the MD properties across the five study cases.




Figure 4. The characteristics of the five study cases related to Indonesia's maritime diplomacy against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas.

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Based on the kinetic effect, an average to a significant level was observed in the MD strategies against Vietnam's IUUF within the North Natuna Seas. This was in line with some previous studies, where a significant kinetic effect signaled the importance of the objective at stake to adversaries. Through the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP, Indonesia was willing to achieve an extensive extent in protecting its sovereignty at sea. According to the study cases, the involvement of the BAKAMLA and Navy represented the tough stance of the country through the strategical utilizations aimed to compel adversaries to alter their actions. This supported the warning shots to the air and the ship platforms, as well as other aggressive maneuvers to stop the actions of IUUF. The intentionality of striking the target solidified Indonesia's intentions of essentially protecting its sovereignty and the North Natuna Seas. However, the last two cases indicated a decline in the kinetic effect (KE) conducted by Indonesian officials. This proved that the aspects of KE were majorly suppressed and present through the KKP, compared to previous cases, which contained the active use of military forces with the conduct of coercive actions. This included blockage, adversary movement prevention, and warning shots. Meanwhile, the study cases involving the KKP lacked a similar form, due to the main action of blocking, capturing, and seizing illegal ships in this aspect. This confirmed that the KKP cases contained insignificant kinetic effects to a specific extent, compared to the Indonesian Navy and BAKAMLA conditions. Therefore, the dominant kinetic effect in these strategies verified the intention of Indonesia to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas, by upholding international law and its desire to avoid futile conflicts with the opposing stakeholder.

All the study cases reflected the country's message explicitness, based on its claims in the North Natuna Seas. This was due to the messages being directly stated by the Indonesian officials during the crisis and post-event, where the actions, aims, resolve, and the consequences of violating its territory were transmitted to the Vietnam vessels. Based on this condition, the utilization of the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP fishing vessels were a clear indication of the country's intent, based on the normalization of its North Natuna Sea claims. This indicated that the active presence of Indonesian officials was the message being transmitted. Based on the substantive message, the country's

officials were straightforward in explaining the methods by which Vietnam vessels illegally trespassed the sea boundaries. Therefore, Indonesia consistently implemented a policy normalizing its claims in the overall waters of the North Natuna Seas, despite inconclusive meetings between both countries in resolving the issue of EEZ and continental shelf boundaries. Based on the message explicitness, the transmission was not misconstrued or misinterpreted in any possible form. This enabled the difficulties of other stakeholders to implement a stance and subsequently place Indonesia at an advantage, in avoiding unnecessary escalation of conflicts. The trajectory of this stance also signified the difficulty level of the country towards future flexibility in the negotiations related to the North Natuna Seas. Indonesia was also confident with its claims in the North Natuna Seas, as the displayed explicitness showed possible future resolution under the country's preference. Despite the varying intensity, all five study cases indicated a strong element of explicitness in the transmitted messages. Based on the involvement of KKP, the intensity of explicitness was less considered compared to those related to the Navy and BAKAMLA. Moreover, KKP strictly disseminated the message of fishing-related activities only, not the overall security of the North Natuna Seas, such as the rhetoric used by the Navy and BAKAMLA.

Among the countries involved in the IUUF, the assessment of power balance also determined the future possibilities of the countries' stability and motivations. To achieve peace, the countries' intention was ideal towards similar power, indicating the presence of the balance factor. Vietnam and Indonesia's power balance was also asymmetrical, subsequently showing that the power balance was unequal. This placed Indonesia at an advantage, as their interests were exerted towards agreement implementation during when negotiations. In Southeast Asia, this country was also superior to Vietnam, as reflected by its GDP, military size, population, and ability to introduce international norms to regional organizations such as ASEAN. To a limited extent, Indonesia had been coercive in confronting illegal Vietnamese fishing ships in the North Natuna Seas, due to being unhesitant in displaying their water ownership, with the violating perpetrators of the international law being punished accordingly. Based on the Vietnam fishing vessels in all cases, the consequence of an unequal power balance showed great repercussions. According to Le Mière (2014), the presence of an asymmetrical balance led to a stronger power enforcing its policy references to the weaker country. This was feasible due to their relatively high power, compared to other groups. Due to being the stronger power perpetrating the water sovereignty protection through a limited coercive pathway, Indonesia reflected its willingness to completely claim the North Natuna Seas, while being rigid with future negotiations with Vietnam. Despite much optimism for the countries to compromise the issue of the EEZ and continental shelf, the asymmetrical power difference still enabled Indonesia to enforce intolerance within the delimitation of their sovereign waters.

In all the study cases displayed, clear indications of the policy being sustained through time were adequately present. This indicated that the regular utilization of the Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP was a common policy for Indonesia. Several recent occurrences were also due to the decrease of coerciveness towards IUUF cases. In Jokowi's first presidential term, the establishment of a deterrent effect was emphasized through the public bombings of illegal fishing vessels. However, the policy was no longer conducted due to the public backlash from neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. Despite this condition, the decrease in coerciveness did not verify that the present implemented policy was newly introduced. This contained strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, warning shots, as well as capturing and seizing illegal ships. The contemporary actions by the Indonesian officials were still considered sustainable

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irrespective of these actions, due to being an extension of previous similar policies, to decrease IUUF in the country's sovereign waters. Therefore, this strategy was adequately sustained despite differing from the previous coercive levels conducted as an Indonesian maritime diplomatic strategy. This confirmed a clear attestation of the country's commitment to its North Natuna Sea policy. The final maritime diplomatic property to be assessed was the pre-emptive or reactive feature. Based on the pre-emptive condition, specific policies were planned to achieve a certain goal. This showed that the protagonist (Indonesia) was confident about its possible outcome when the policy was sustained and pre-emptively prepared, due to its unmoved stance. Meanwhile, the reactive feature was conducted based on an impromptu nature. Under this category, the events were subjected to the possibilities of uncertainties, as reactive maritime diplomacy did not provide sufficient time to prepare and plan actions. This led to a lack of ability in mapping possible scenarios to a specific event outcome. According to Le Mièrre (2014), reactive diplomacy was found to open greater possibilities when events evolved to become more dangerous and escalatory. Based on the findings in the case at hand, all the study cases involved in this report were represented reactive diplomacy as such. Furthermore, Indonesia continuously conducted the policies of strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, capturing and seizing illegal ships, as well as warning shots against Vietnam's IUUF, which were performed as sources of response towards trespassing fishing ships. This diplomacy established greater uncertainties based on the orientation of the study cases' situations, as officials often encountered fishing boats under the disguise of the Indonesian flag, turning off their lights at midnight, and using aggressive maneuvers. Le Mièrre (2014) also stated that reactive policies were more dangerous due to the uncertainties and possibility of unforeseen escalations. To a specific extent, the crisis in the North Natuna Seas increased due to the impromptu and instinctive responses of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, and KKP. However, there was a line not exceeded by Indonesian officials, despite their reactive actions. This was based on not exceeding their traditional coerciveness in handling illegal ship poaching in the North Natuna Seas.

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#### Policy Implications

Amidst the geopolitical and geostrategic adjustments in the Indo-Pacific, state actors were wary of coercive sea maneuvers. This indicated that Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy in the North Natuna Seas contained pivotal policy implications for regional security. Unlike the Chinese sustained maneuvers in its claimed "dash lines" of the South China Sea or the US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea or Pacific Oceans, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy was reactive in confronting the Vietnamese IUUF. This confirmed that the strict patrols, aggressive maneuvers, and warning shots against the IUUF vessels were a form of response towards trespassers on the sea boundaries. Therefore, Indonesia needs to showcase greater coerciveness in protecting its sea territory in specific future intrusion cases. Nevertheless, despite the displaying of aggressiveness, future studies will need to address whether coercively responding to cases of illegal intrusions are effective in deterring future cases of IUUF or not. As the study cases in Indonesia have shown, whatever the form of aggressiveness taken by Indonesia in responding to IUUF, Vietnam continues its approach of IUUF in the North Natuna Seas in the following years.

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Despite this aggressiveness, the country had never violated existing international laws and regulations.

Another major maritime characteristic of Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy is the lack of power balance between Vietnam and Indonesia. Indonesia displayed a more straightforward and coercive response by the protagonist, towards the

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IUUF vessels from the antagonist (Vietnam). Meanwhile, the actions were more reluctant in similarly responding to the Chinese fishing vessels. Indonesian forces were not also reluctant in the conduct of their maritime diplomatic strategies, due to being in a position to exert their interests against Vietnam. This indicated that continuous hostility was a possibility when Vietnam and Indonesia failed to conclude the UNCLOS provisional agreement on their overlapping EEZ claims.<sup>1</sup>

In the domains of kinetic effect, sustainment, and explicitness, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy was considered consistent. This was because they are frequently explicit in coercing foreign trespassing ships through a military medium, to compel adversaries to alter their actions. They also conducted sustainable sea operations through the Indonesian law enforcement, including BAKAMLA, KKP, POLRI, and the Navy. Based on these results, all the Indonesian bodies need to synergize in countering IUUF cases, especially in Vietnam.

### Conclusion

In the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategy has evolved with time, with Jokowi reorienting the policies to a more accommodative one for neighboring states, regarding the reduction of the sea coerciveness level. Differing to his past predecessors, Jokowi decided to place the priority of maritime diplomacy as the cornerstone of his foreign policy, unlike the more neutral and non-alignment priority adopted in past years. From the outset, Jokowi's second presidential term accommodated the critiques against the public display of destructions of ships which enter Indonesian waters illegally. Contemporary adjustments ensured that the level of coerciveness displayed is mild and not intimidate Indonesia's neighbors in Southeast Asia. Despite these adjustments, tensions remain between Indonesia and Vietnam at least partly because of the still unresolved ocean boundaries between the two countries in the North Natuna Sea. The unresolved hurdle has led to a rising number of IUUF occurrences perpetrated by Vietnamese flagged-fishing vessels. These have increased concerns in Jakarta, irrespective of the long history of cooperation among Southeast Asian countries in multilateral forums such as ASEAN.

This study assessed the MD strategies of Jokowi against Vietnam's IUUF in the North Natuna Seas, with five selected cases being evaluated for better understanding. These cases involved Indonesian governmental raids, captures, and seizures of illegal fishing boats infiltrating Indonesia's waters between 2020-2021. Each study case also indicated the adequate responses of the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA, or KKP, confirming the country's intention to protect its claims in the North Natuna Seas, although it was willing to avoid needless water conflicts. Through Le Miere's five-point framework, Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's IUUF exhibited the following, (1) heavily contained kinetic effect, (2) maintenance of policy through time (consistent responses), (3) message explicitness accompanying the diplomatic action, (4) more reactive diplomacy than pre-emptive strategy, and (5) lack of power balance between stakeholders. Furthermore, this article further argues that the strategies reflected mildly coerced and sustained efforts to compel aggressors (in this case the Vietnamese) towards steering outside of Indonesia's sea boundaries, through raids, captures, and seizures of illegal fishing boats.

<sup>1</sup> Indonesia and Vietnam is currently concluding a provisional agreement to regulate the overlapping EEZ claims in the North Natuna Seas (South China Seas). The unresolved claims have resulted to numerous incidents between the fishing vessels of both countries, and has shown to be a major point of irritant to the long-standing bilateral relations of Indonesia and Vietnam. Indonesia and Vietnam has sought to bilaterally resolve the issue through the establishment of a Technical Meeting on the Delimitation of the EEZ, which is currently entering the 12<sup>th</sup> round.

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## BALASAN AKHIR DARI EDITOR:

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### **(Asian Affairs: An American Review) A revise decision has been made on your submission**

4 messages

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**Paul Wesley Chambers** <em@editorialmanager.com>  
Reply-To: Paul Wesley Chambers <pwchambers@gmail.com>  
To: Bama Andika Putra <bama@unhas.ac.id>

Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 8:52 AM

Ref.: Ms. No. AsianAffairs-D-22-00005

Construing Indonesia's maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam's Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in the North Natuna Sea  
Asian Affairs: An American Review

Dear Mr Putra,

Our reviewers have now considered your paper and have recommended publication in Asian Affairs: An American Review. We are pleased to accept your paper in its current form which will now be forwarded to the publisher for copy editing and typesetting. The reviewer comments are included at the bottom of this letter, along with those of the editor who coordinated the review of your paper.

You will receive proofs for checking, and instructions for transfer of copyright in due course.

The publisher also requests that proofs are checked through the publisher's tracking system and returned within 48 hours of receipt.

Thank you for your contribution to Asian Affairs: An American Review and we look forward to receiving further submissions from you.

Best regards,

Paul Wesley Chambers, Ph.D.  
Executive Editor  
Asian Affairs: An American Review